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Abstract  
 
           The South African Border War 1966 – 1989 was a war fought between South Africa, 
Cuba and Angola. Battles were mainly fought in southern Angola but within South West Africa 
SWAPO attempted to mount an insurgency against South Africa. This saw the introduction of 
several unique South African unconventional units and managed to win many battles but this did 
not result in South African political success. This thesis looks at these units in depth and analyses 
their impact by describing some of the operations in which the Recces, 32 Bn, 44 Parachute 
Brigade and Koevoet were involved.  In the introduction the background of the war is looked at, 
followed by an introduction to each of the four units in question. The main part of the thesis 
consists of various South African operations during the war, followed by an analysis and lastly a 
conclusion is reached regarding the political outcome.  
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Introduction 
 
 During the South African Border War the main South African efforts were made with 
specialized unconventional ground units who managed many victories in the battlefield. 
However these victories did little to bring about a victory for South Africa.  This paper will look 
at these units in detail and come to a conclusion about why the successes on the battlefield were 
not translated into political success. Firstly a brief introduction to unconventional warfare.  
 
“Military activities conducted through or with underground, auxiliary or guerrilla forces 
to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power1.” This is the definition provided by the NATO glossary of military terms. 
There is no standard definition for unconventional warfare let alone for unconventional units, 
there are however certain characteristics they all have in common. First and foremost 
unconventional units are established to add specific capabilities to a country’s security forces 
that lies outside the traditional framework of defense. Unconventional units allow for greater 
options which is in no small part due to the fact they are often operate under total secrecy.  The 
definition that will be used in this thesis will rather focus on these characteristics as opposed to 
creating a definition that is to be set in stone.  
Area of focus 
 A total of four units were chosen for this thesis because they matched certain 
characteristics in the South African Border War, the conflict that lies at the heart of this research. 
                                                          
1 Aksit, C. (2012). NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (ENGLISH AND FRENCH). Brussels: NATO. 
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These four units were the 32 Battalion, the South West African Police Counterinsurgency Unit 
(Koevoet), the 1st Reconnaissance Commando (Recces) and the 44 Parachute Brigade. These 
units will be introduced in some detail below but first it is time to list the characteristics that 
made these units unique.  
All of these units were created to respond to specific challenges on the battlefield that 
could not be met by conventional military means. These four units all had an elite status and 
extensive selection procedures, especially the Recces. Most SADF units stationed in SWA only 
stayed there for short deployments, the four units mentioned above were active in the warzone 
fulltime and thus had a much better understanding of the war than most other units.   
Operating covertly was an essential characteristic for these units in order to maintain 
plausible deniability on the part of the South African government. The nature of the operations 
that these units undertook was highly dangerous and required special training as well as tactics to 
perform. In addition it was these units that bore the brunt of the fighting, as well as the casualties 
during the war.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly to show the importance these units had during 
the Border War. Secondly and most importantly to show how despite achieving military 
successes on the battlefield these military successes were not translated into political success. By 
definition military force is used in an effort to achieve political goals.  
Before moving onto the units themselves a few other points need to be addressed, firstly 
the sources used for this paper and secondly the political situation of South Africa, which heavily 
influenced the war itself. The political situation is very important in order to explain why the 
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successes on the battlefield were not enough to achieve political success for South Africa. 
Sources  
 ‘In war, truth is the first casualty’ was said by the Greek Aeschylus more than 2,500 
years ago yet these famous words remain true to this very day. In wartime objectivity nowhere to 
be found with both sides seeking to undermine each other, often in an effort to attempt to 
‘justify’ their actions.  
 The Border War is no different in that sense. It pitted South Africa and to a small degree 
the United States against a socialist bloc comprising of Angola, Cuba, the USSR and her allies. 
The Border War was a very complicated conflict that also featured many non-state actors such as 
SWAPO and the UN. Furthermore it was a conflict that was resolved with both sides claiming 
victory though in practice neither side accomplished all their objectives.  
 The Border War is a very difficult war to analyze not only because of the many countries 
and factions involved but primarily due to the lack of common ground when it comes to sources. 
The sources which are available, which are not that many to begin with, are clearly divided as 
being either pro – South Africa or anti – South Africa. While controversy with regards to wars is 
nothing special, with regards to this conflict, controversy is taken to another level entirely. In 
particular with regards to the battle of Cuito Cuanavale 1987 – 1988 available sources paint a 
drastically different picture of events.  
 While this thesis seeks to utilize sources from both sides it proved to be very difficult to 
find sources that apply to the very specific topic of elite South African units. Non South African 
sources are used but they can only be used in the bigger pictures as they simply do not include 
the level of detail required for this subject. Therefore nearly all sources used in this thesis are 
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from the South African perspective and they also cover the units in question with the most 
details. The sources themselves most date from the post-Apartheid era with a few exceptions, 
though it should be noted that the majority of sources are aimed for a white South African 
audience. This bias should be kept in mind while reading this thesis but unfortunately there is 
little that can be done about this as these sources offer the best insights into the subject matter.  
Political situation of South Africa 
 The Border War took place in a very complex political climate. It involved a variety of 
both state and non-state actors and it’s one of the Cold War’s many so-called “proxy wars”. In 
order to gain a better understanding of the conflict, a closer look at South Africa’s political 
situation is required. In this section, both the domestic and foreign politics will be looked at.  
Domestic 
 The most important domestic factor was the victory of the National Party led by Mr. 
Henrik Verwoerd in 1948 which saw the introduction of Apartheid. While it is outside the scope 
of this paper to go into detail about Apartheid, Apartheid did play a very large role in both 
domestic and foreign South African politics.   
 The National Party was continuously in power from 1948 until 1994 when Nelson 
Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) won the elections, the first fully democratic 
elections in the country’s history. During the Apartheid period, the National Party was able to 
rule virtually without any domestic opposition. During this period the ANC was banned and 
labeled a ‘communist terrorist group’. On the whole, the Whites in South Africa, the only ones 
with real power under the Apartheid laws, went along with Apartheid and those who opposed it 
were persecuted.  
10 
 
 Domestically, the biggest problems faced by the National Party were to keep order. 
Starting in the 1960’s, the ANC began a violent campaign which included bombings and 
assassinations in an attempt to destabilize South Africa. The National Party’s top priority was to 
remain in power and to deal with any threats, both domestic and foreign to the best of their 
ability.  
Foreign 
 In terms of foreign politics, South Africa was in a very difficult position mostly due to its 
Apartheid policies. Apartheid was condemned by the international community and as a result of 
that, there was an international embargo placed against South Africa in an effort for the country 
to abandon Apartheid. This embargo was not universal but it did make it very difficult for South 
Africa to strengthen her military. Only very few countries were willing to sell arms to South 
Africa, where under France. Apart from arms most countries were reluctant to invest heavily in 
South Africa because they were worried about the response of their citizens and the international 
community.  
 The fall of the Portuguese colonial empire in southern Africa and the signing of the 
Lancaster House Agreement left South Africa isolated and essentially without allies. The United 
States did give some support during the Border War through the CIA, but this was only covert 
and did not last.  
 In both foreign and domestic politics, South Africa saw itself as the last bastion of white 
power in Africa, ever since Rhodesia became Zimbabwe. The fall of Rhodesia was extremely 
worrying to South Africa as Rhodesia had been a friendly buffer state between South Africa and 
other countries that viewed South Africa as hostile.  
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 The status of South West Africa (Namibia) played a crucial role in this bigger picture. 
South Africa sought to keep hold of this territory whilst her enemies wanted South Africa to 
relinquish her claims to this territory which was allegedly illegally occupied and should become 
independent. South Africa was extremely concerned that when they lost South West Africa, the 
war would spill over into South Africa itself and result in the complete destruction of South 
Africa.  
The international arms embargo also meant that South Africa would have to adapt her 
military accordingly. As a result South Africa developed an extensive military arms research and 
production program to manufacture their own weapons and supplies. In addition, South Africa 
went on to develop specialized units, such as those mentioned in this paper, to help deal with 
specific problems faced during the Border War.  
There was another reason why South Africa preferred to use small specialized units 
during the Border War. It offered deniability. With South Africa under intense international 
scrutiny, it was much easier to use unconventional units as it was far easier to deny their use in 
the field. Operations carried out by the 32 Bn, Koevoet, 44 Brigade and the Recces were hardly 
known in South Africa, which was exactly what the SA leadership wanted. Firstly to give the 
impression that everything was under control and secondly to keep the international community 
at bay. Due to these two reasons the civilian leadership was often in disagreement with the South 
African Defense Force (SADF) on the best way to fight the war. Often the SADF was told that 
the war would have to be fought in limited ways using limited forces and because of this the 
unconventional units were used.  
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The origins of the Border War 
The South African Border War, commonly referred to as the Angolan Bush War or 
simply the Bush War was a conflict that took place from 1966 to 1989. It mostly took place in 
South-West Africa (Namibia) and Angola between South Africa and her allies facing Angola and 
her allies, primarily Cuba. The South African Border War, henceforth known as Border War, 
was very much entangled with the Angolan Civil War as well as the Namibian War of 
Independence.  
The roots of the conflict can be found in 1915 when South Africa invaded German South 
– West Africa (Namibia) as requested by the Allied Forces. After the end of the First World War 
the League of Nations put South Africa in charge of the territory labelling it a C-class mandate2. 
The territory was ruled as a de facto fifth province, with a small part of around Walvisbay being 
incorporated by the Cape Province3.  
In 1945, the United Nations (UN) was formed and together with the League of Nations 
dissolved in 1946 the South African government under Jan Smuts sought to take over the entire 
territory. In 1946, South Africa formally applied to the UN for this but the request on grounds 
that the population of South West Africa (SWA) had not been properly informed. Instead the UN 
requested South Africa to place SWA under closer international monitoring, the so-called 
trusteeship, in which the administration would be examined by international monitors, but South 
Africa refused. There was no obligation for South Africa to enter in this trusteeship agreement 
                                                          
2 Goldstein, Langhorne, Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy, 2004, p13 
3 Shillington. Encyclopedia of African history, 2005, p1066 
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and the end result was a legal dispute that would not be resolved for another 44 years, until 1990. 
The UN took this matter to the International Court of Justice which in 1950 ruled that: 
 ‘the mandate given to South Africa was still in force; that the UN had taken over the 
League’s supervisory functions; that South Africa couldn’t unilaterally alter the 
international status of the territory; and that it was still under no obligation to enter into 
trusteeship agreement with the UN’4.  
Formation of SWAPO/PLAN 
It was in the late 1950’s that organized resistance began against the administration of 
SWA by South Africa with the forming in 1957 of the Owambo People’s Congress (OPC) in 
Cape Town, South Africa. Its main purpose was initially to oppose the unjust labor laws which 
prevented the Owambo people for working outside their home region unless they could manage 
to obtain a special permit, which were only valid for a short period of time. Two years later, in 
1959 the OPC was renamed into the Owambo People’s Organisation (OPC). It was in April of 
that year that Sam Nujoma became the leader of the organization in Windhoek, the capital of 
SWA. Later on Sam Nujoma became the first president of independent Namibia in 1990. In 1960 
that OPC was reconstituted as the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO)5.  
The main aim of SWAPO was to gain independence from South Arica in the form of an 
independent black ruled state. They would start by undermining the existing administration and 
to eventually take over. The People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) was established in 
1962 and under the guidance of Nujoma it started to recruit Owambo tribesmen to be trained in 
                                                          
4 ICJ. (1950). International status of South-West Africa. The Hague: ICJ. 
 
5 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p16 
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guerilla warfare and sabotage6. PLAN fighters were trained in neighboring countries, such as 
Angola, Tanzania but also in the Soviet Union and other Soviet aligned nations. It was 
impossible to train in SWA as this was too dangerous. The plan was to infiltrate small units of 
PLAN into SWA to establish bases close to the Angolan border.  This effectively set the stage 
for an armed conflict as South African authorities would not yield to SWAPO or any other black 
liberation movement and would use force if so required.  
In the summer of 1965, six PLAN fighters trained in Tanzania, infiltrated into SWA 
across the Zambian and Angolan border. This group set up a base in Ongulusmbashe in 
Owamboland, the border region next to Angola. ‘This initial group, and their successors, were 
responsible for the string of attacks, murders and mayhem that was to evolve into the conflict 
that came to be known as the ‘Border War’’7   
South Africa enters the War 
Initially counter-insurgency was the responsibility of the South African Police (SAP) 
within SWA but on April 1st 1974 it was handed over to the South African Defense Force 
(SADF)8.  Counter insurgency is defined as ‘Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to 
defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances9.’ The main reason behind using the 
police instead of the military was that initially the South African leadership sought not to 
escalate the conflict but they soon realized that they had no choice, due to increasing violence 
from SWAPO/PLAN.  
                                                          
6 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p17 
7 Lord, Dick, From Fledging to Eagle, 2008, p42 
8 Lord, Dick, From Fledging to Eagle, 2008, p44 
9 Aksit, C. (2012). NATO GLOSSAR OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (ENGLISH AND FRENCH). Brussels: NATO. 
15 
 
At first the SAP was poorly equipped and vastly undermanned to guard the very long 
northern border of SWA. This changed in 1966 when a few SADF helicopters were brought in 
from SA to increase the mobility of the SAP units operating in the border area10.  
In the spring of 1966 the SWA authorities received information that there might be a 
secret SWAPO base somewhere in the Owamboland area. It was then decided by Pretoria (seat 
of South African government) to send a special team under command of Major ‘Rooi Rus’ (Red 
Russian) Swanepoel into SWA to investigate this rumor11.  
By the beginning of August 1966, Swanepoel’s team had confirmed that there was a 
SWAPO base in the Owamboland area but they had not yet managed to fix the location. It was 
however clear that a full-scale assault would have to be made on the base and for this purpose 
additional men and equipment were gathered. The biggest problems facing the South Africans 
were bureaucratic ones, the SADF was not allowed to intervene as the SAP held full 
responsibility. The SAP was completely unprepared for any military operation, they had neither 
the proper weapons nor specialized units. Pretoria then decided to send experienced personnel 
from the 1st Parachute Battalion to SWA, though they would be wearing police uniforms, to 
assist the SAP12. 
A force of 24 men and seven helicopters was raised and spent time training for the assault 
at a military base just outside of Pretoria. This mission would be unique as it was the first time 
the SAP would launch a counter-insurgency operation as well as it being the first time that SADF 
personnel would be involved in ground combat since the end of WWII13.  
                                                          
10 Lord, Dick, From Fledging to Eagle, 2008, p44 
11 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p20 
12 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p23 
13 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p23 
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The operation codenamed Operation Blouwildebees (Blue Wildebeest) took place in the 
morning of August 26, 196614. This date is generally regarded as the start of the Border War, a 
war that would last until 1989. The operation was commanded on the ground by Commandant 
(Lieutenant-Colonel) Jan Breytenbach, a man who would be pivotal in the development of SA’s 
unconventional units as will become clear later on. The overall command lay with SAP Brigadier 
Dillon. Inexperience on the part of the South Africans was reflected by the fact that only two 
SWAPO fighters were killed, a further nine were captured and the remainder fled the scene15. 
The South Africans themselves suffered no casualties in this surprise helicopter assault.  
Jan Breytenbach and other men taking part in this operation would end up as some of the 
most distinguished personnel of the SADF during the Border War. Jan Breytenbach in particular 
had a very important role in the development of South Africa’s unconventional units, in 
particular with the 32 Battalion, 44 Parachute Brigade as well as with the Special Forces 
(Recces). Breytenbach started his carrier in the Royal Navy where he served in the Suez Crisis in 
1956. He also took courses in England before he returned to the newly Republic of South Africa, 
where he had to make the difficult choice to leave the Royal Navy, or risk losing his South 
African citizenship16. Breytenbach and some other SADF personnel took part in a Rhodesian 
SAS (Special Air Service, Special Forces unit) selection course which he and 11 others took, the 
majority of them passing17. It was after this course that Breytenbach suggested to establish a 
South African Special Forces Unit to the head of the SADF at the time, General Hiemstra, who 
was very much against the idea of losing the best and brightest of conventional units to an 
                                                          
14 Lord, Dick, From Fledging to Eagle, 2008, p45 
15 Willem Steenkamp, South Africa’s Border War 1966 – 1989, 1989, p22 
16 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p20 
17 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p23 
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untested and untried unconventional setup18. Soon however, international events in Biafra 
(Nigeria) lay at the root of the formation of the first South African unconventional unit, the 
Reconnaissance Commando (Recces).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p20 - 21 
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Origin of the Reconnaissance Commando (Recces)  
Nigeria was granted independence from the British Commonwealth on October 1st, 1960. 
In 1967, due to vast unrest and prosecution of the Ibo tribe, the eastern part of the Nigeria 
proclaimed itself independent and called itself Biafra19. By late 1967, after initial skirmishes 
were fought, a full scale civil war had erupted. Almost immediately Nigeria blockaded the whole 
country of Biafra. Biafra started off in a vastly inferior military position and sought extensive 
help from foreign countries including South Africa.  
At the beginning of 1969, Major General Frits Loots was on a liaison mission with the 
Portuguese in Luanda, Angola and was approached by two officers from Biafra who asked for 
South Africa’s aid. At the time, Loots was the director of South Africa’s military intelligence. 
Later on Loots would become the commanding officer of all South African Special Forces20. The 
situation was deteriorating rapidly for Biafra and the officers urgently requested South Africa to 
provide them with weapons and supplies to aid their struggle.  
Loots took the request to Pretoria where it was decided that covertly aiding Biafra would 
benefit’s South Africa’s position politically. It was acknowledged that militarily the aid provided 
would amount to ‘only a drop in the ocean’ and that Biafra’s days of independence would soon 
be over21. In the end it was decided that South Africa would supply Biafra forces as well as train 
them in guerilla tactics. This would have been a task for the Special Forces but at the time (1969) 
no such unit was yet in existence.  Eventually the task was assigned to Commandant 
Breytenbach who chose some men who had joined him in the SAS course, as part of his team.  
                                                          
19 Meredith, Martin. The first dance of freedom – Black Africa in the postwar era, 1984, p208 – 211 
20 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p56 
21 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p25 
19 
 
 Breytenbach and his team flew into Biafra through Rhodesian aid and began training 
Biafra guerilla fighters as well as bringing in supplies. By late 1969, it became clear that the 
Biafra war effort would not be able to last for much longer despite South Africa’s, and other 
nations’ best efforts. The whole operation, as outlined by the start by general Loots was just a 
‘drop in the ocean’ but politically the operation was a success in cementing relations with other 
African nations. At the beginning of 1970, organized resistance collapsed and the state of Biafra 
ceased to exist. Breytenbach first left Biafra for France where he took part in French Special 
Forces training, previously unknown to foreigners but he eventually returned to South Africa in 
March 197022.  
 Despite the fact that Biafra fell soon after South Africa pledged covert military support, 
the success of the operation convinced general Loots that the SADF needed its own permanent 
Special Forces unit. By success it is meant the political success that South Africa achieved, as 
well as gaining military experience. The Defense Minister at the time, P.W. Botha approved 
Loot’s plan to form such a unit, even though SADF chief, General Hiemstra was still against it.  
 The unit was put into motion, very low key and Loots placed Breytenbach in command. 
Breytenbach used his Biafra team as the foundation for the new unit and soon after he managed 
to recruit 12 Officers and lower ranks for the new unit. Initially the unit was called the:  
‘Alpha Operation Experimental Group, then for a time the Delta Operation Test Group. 
Its purpose, if anyone cared to ask, was to test the readiness and awareness of other army 
formations23’. At first the unit was highly covert as it was not officially sanctioned by the SADF 
top brass. The unit’s first mission took place in August 1970 when they were asked to plot water 
                                                          
22 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p33 
23 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p24 
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holes in Angola which were used by SWAPO units. This was not quite the start the unit had in 
mind but nonetheless they got the job done together with some Portuguese units.  
The unit undertook a more challenging mission in 1971 when it began a mining campaign 
to counter SWAPO operation in SWA in the Caprivi region. By 1971 SWAPO had begun to 
actively plant mines (both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel) to attack the SAP units patrolling the 
area as well as to intimidate the local population.  
By late 1971, the mines had become a grave problem and Pretoria decided that the risk 
was too big politically to attack camps in Zambia, where intelligence sources had determined 
that SWAPO units would withdraw to after they planted their mines.  
Without authorization from Pretoria, Breytenbach took matters is in his own hands and 
decided his unit would plant mines of their own in retaliation. Teams of two to a maximum of 
five Recces infiltrated into Zambia and planted mines which caused many casualties. Mostly 
Zambian military personnel but also SWAPO. 
 Soon after the first reports, Breytenbach was called to Pretoria, he expected a medal but 
instead was questioned about the situation like he had done something terribly wrong. At first 
Breytenbach denied all accusations. Later on when he spoke to General Louw, he admitted that it 
was his unit that carried out the mining in Zambia. Gouw was pleased with Breytenbach and said 
‘Good show, it’s about time we retaliated24’.  
                                                          
24 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p45 
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It was not until October 1st 1972 when the unit became official after a change of 
personnel at the highest levels of the SADF. Admiral Bierman became the SADF Chief and 
General Malan took over as the head of the army25.  
 The unit was officially entitled the Number 1 – Reconnaissance Commando, even 
though Breytenbach suggested it should be called the Parachute Commando, but General Loots 
disagreed, thus in the end the name Reconnaissance Commando struck or Recces for short.  
During the decades that followed the Recces took part in many operations during the 
Border War, which will be looked at later. First another unit which owed a lot to Jan 
Breytenbach will be looked at, the 32 Battalion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Stiff, Peter, The Covert War, 2004, p38 
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 Origin of the 32 Battalion  
The 32 Battalion was without doubt the SADF’s most controversial, yet at the same time 
its most distinguished unit that served during the Border War. This is another SADF unit that 
owed a lot to Breytenbach’s input, who served as the unit’s first commander, founding the unit in 
1975. 
 The 32 Battalion (known hereafter as 32 Bn) came into existence in the aftermath of the 
Angolan Civil War. Portugal granted independence to Angola and its other African colonies in 
November 1975, in the aftermath of the coup that took place in Portugal in 1974.  
 During the war that led to the eventual independence of Angola, three organizations were 
involved, who fought not only against the Portuguese, but also amongst each other. These were: 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Liberation Front of 
Angola (FNLA) and lastly the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).  
The MPLA was supported by the socialist bloc, most importantly the Soviet Union and 
Cuba whereas UNITA and FNLA were supported by the West, most importantly the United 
States and South Africa. Starting in early 1975, South Africa began delivering weapons and 
supplies to FNLA to aid them in their struggle against the MPLA26. Initially the FNLA held the 
military advantage but in the months that followed the MPLA gradually turned the tide and it 
became evident to Pretoria that more aid would be needed to halt the MPLA. 
                                                          
26 Nortje, Piet, 32 Battalion, 2003, p2 -3 
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On August 28th 1975, Operational Order 8/75 was signed by SA defense minister PW 
Both, stating that the SADF would provide ‘whatever support was needed to halt the MPLA’s 
advance27.’ A few days earlier UNITA and FNLA joined forces to counter the MPLA together.  
The SADF came to the conclusion that in order for their weapons to be best utilized the 
FNLA ought to be trained by SADF personnel on the ground and this assignment fell upon Jan 
Breytenbach28.  
Breytenbach was of the opinion that adding SADF officers to FNLA units would be 
effective: 
‘… the success of operation depends on good low level command and control, which 
means white South African control, also to be exercised over logistical support… they (FNLA) 
requested that we should support them not only with training, but also with the physical planning 
and control of operations29.’  
 On September 24th, 1975 South Africa began Operation Savannah in an effort to aid 
FNLA and UNITA and sought to push back the MPLA. This operation will be described in 
greater detail in the following section. Breytenbach commanded Bravo Group, a rag tag unit that 
would form the eventual nucleus of the feared 32 Bn.  
The 32 Bn consisted mostly of Angolan troops and South African officers plus other men 
from all over the world. At first Breytenbach had virtually nothing to work with except for the 
determination of him and his staff. It was only bit by bit that his unit received equipment and it 
                                                          
27 Nortje, Piet, 32 Battalion, 2003, p5 
28 Lord, Dick, From Fledging to Eagle, 2008, p38 
29 Nortje, Piet, 32 Battalion, 2003, p9 
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would take until August 29th 1977 till the 32 Bn was an officially designated SADF unit. A telex 
was received that include the following: 
 ‘Col van Heerden (Army HQ) confirms that the org of 32 Bn was finally approved and 
accepted by minister on Monday 29 Aug 1977…Congratulations – at last!30’  
After the 32 Bn came into existence it saw combat more than any other unit, apart from 
perhaps the Recces, which is in no small part due to the fact that the 32 Bn base was right at the 
frontline, located at Bagani in the Caprivi Strip31. The next unit to be looked at is the 44 
Parachute Brigade, this was yet another unit which had a large input from Jan Breytenbach.  
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Origin of the 44 Parachute Brigade  
The 44 Parachute Brigade was formed on April 20th 1978 and commanded from the 
outset by Brigadier M.J. du Plessis and Colonel Jan Breytenbach, the latter was a qualified 
parachute officer. The unit was formed after Defense Minister P.W. Botha gave the approval in 
April 1978.  
The South African history with regard to paratroopers dates from September 1960 when 
it was decided that 15 officers would undergo paratrooper training with the Royal Air Force. 
Rhodesia had just created its own paratrooper unit and in the aftermath of the Sharpeville 
massacre, tensions began to rise in South Africa.  All these men received their wings and the 
men returned to South Africa in December 1960. These men formed the nucleus around which 
the 1st Parachute Battalion would be built.  Under SADF Order 74/61, the 1st Parachute Battalion 
officially came into existence on April 1st 1961, a mere two months before South Africa declared 
itself a Republic32. This unit was founded at Bloemfontein at the Tempe base. Initially this unit 
consisted solely of Permanent Force (fulltime SADF personnel) however later on Citizen Force 
(part-time) also became a part of the unit. As has been stated previously members of this unit 
took part in Operation Blouwildebees in August 1966, marking the first time that SADF 
personnel were used in combat since the end of WWII.  
The unit’s first deployment as an independent unit came with the advent of Operation 
Savannah in 1974/1975. Two companies were deployed two relieve Portuguese communities 
who had gotten trapped by the MPLA.  
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Initially the brigade amounted to 1st Parachute battalion (Permanent Force) and 2 and 3 
Parachute Battalions (Citizen Force). However the SADF soon came to the conclusion that these 
units, comprising solely of infantry would simply not be a sufficiently balanced force for 
conventional operations. It was thus decided to reorganize the unit into an all-arms formation 
that included an airborne component, thus the brigade was expanded to allow for engineer, 
signals, anti-tank, maintenance, anti-aircraft as well as workshop units to give the brigade a near 
self-sufficient profile. 
It was in May 1978 that the 44 Parachute Brigade would become famous for Operation 
Reindeer, which took play in Cassinga, Angola. This operation will be described in detail in the 
following section.  
         The final unit to be looked at is the South West African Police Counterinsurgency Unit 
(Koevoet), this was a very unique unit and one that Jan Breytenbach had no part in.  
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Origin of the South West African Police Counterinsurgency Unit (Koevoet) 
 
        The South West African Police Counterinsurgency Unit (known hereafter as Koevoet) was 
the most effective unit against SWAPO. During the period 1978 – 1989, whilst comprising only 
10% of all forces in SWA, they were responsible for some 70% of all contacts with SWAPO33.  
 As was stated in the introduction, SWAPO began infiltrating into SWA starting in the mid 
1960’s. By the late 1970’s SWAPO increased its efforts and the conventional approach carried 
out by South Africa was simply not effective enough to counter this threat. The SADF was in 
control externally, yet internally SWAPO was growing ever more powerful.  
 The use of mines by SWAPO was demoralizing both the local SWA population but also 
reducing the movement of the security forces. By 1978 the war in SWA was literally a stalemate.  
 ‘On March 1977 PW Botha announced in parliament that in the two years since April 1975, 
231 insurgents had been killed in Owamboland, the Kavanago and the Eastern Caprivi. The 
Security Forces had lost 33 men and the infiltrators had killed 53 black civilians during the 
period34.’  
 Brigadier Jannie Geldenhuys took over as General Officer Commanding South West Africa 
Command. His primary task was to ‘manage the security situation and contain the level of 
insurgency so that the constitutional process could develop in an atmosphere of peace and 
stability35’. Another task Geldenhuys set out to do was to reduce the number of South Africans 
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fighting in SWA by replacing them with SWA personnel. By 1982, 60% of those serving in 
SWA were from SWA and by the end of the decade this number went up over 70% of the total36.  
In the midst of 1978 Colonel ‘Sterk’ (strong) Hans Dreyer, an SAP officer who served in 
Rhodesia was sent to SWA. The SAP and the SADF had discussed the insurgency problems in 
SWA and wanted to come up with a solution. The plan was to use the Recces and the security 
branch (special police charged with national/internal security) working together to establish a 
unit that operated like the Selous Scouts in Rhodesia. The Selous Scouts were a highly effective 
counter insurgency unit that was highly praised and seen as a model for counter insurgency 
operations.  
Dreyer’s initial task was to set up intelligence gathering operation of the local SWA 
population, this was Top Secret Operation K, K standing for Koevoet (Afrikaans for crowbar)37. 
The idea was to gather intelligence by using the local SWA population about SWAPO’s 
movements and whereabouts. Once the intelligence was analyzed and deemed useful, orders 
would be given to the Recces to move in and to eliminate SWAPO.  
 Initially Dreyer started off with just four men under his command. ‘How can I fight a war 
with only four men?’ Dreyer asked his boss, police Commissioner Johan Coetzee. ‘It will have to 
do for a start’ was Coetzee’s reply38.  
It soon became apparent that the plan would need to be revised as the Recces were too 
preoccupied in Angola to be able to offer much assistance in terms of capturing SWAPO for 
intelligence. The operation was changed entirely and reverted back to ‘basic’ police work by 
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creating networks of informers, talking to the local populace. Dreyer soon also discovered that 
the local population, the Owambos were excellent trackers. Dreyer then made sure that his 
expanding staff would consist of teams of police constables who would always employ trackers 
as well to track SWAPO tracks.  
The addition of trackers changed Koevoet around and the unit was soon vastly expanded 
and also given special equipment to deal with the landmine threat. Special mine protected 
vehicles called Casspirs were allocated.  
‘Combining their police investigational abilities and skills at getting information, the 
tracking abilities of their special constables, the landmine protection provide by their Casspirs – 
with the support of SAAF helicopter gunships – Koevoet emerged as the premier counter-
insurgency unit in SWA39.’   
During the ten years of existence, Koevoet took part in 1615 contacts with SWAPO and 
managed to kill/capture 3,225 SWAPO for the loss of 160 dead and 949 wounded Koevoet. 
Koevoet suffered more casualties than any other South African unit during the Border War40.  
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Chapter 3 
Select South African Operations during the Border War 
 
        This section, the main part of this thesis, is designed to give the reader an indication of the 
type operations undertaken by the abovementioned units. Given the length of this thesis, it is 
impossible to even mention all of the operations thus a choice was made to mention a few select 
operations. The decision was made to mention every unit in at least one operation with the 
exception of Koevoet, who will receive their own separate section as the nature of their 
operations was vastly different from those of the other units in question.    
The operations to be used are as follows, written in chronological order: 
 Operation Savannah 1975 – 1976 by Bravo Group (later became 32 Bn) 
 Operation Reindeer 1978 by 44th Parachute Brigade and 32 Bn 
 Operation Super 1982 by 32 Bn 
 Operation Askari 1983 – 1984 by 32 Bn and Recces 
 Koevoet Operations 1979 – 1989 (own separate section, as they undertook more than 
1,600 engagements with SWAPO/PLAN in SWA) 
 Battle of Cuito Cuananavale (Operations Modular, Hooper and Packer) 1987 -1988 by 
32 Bn, 44th Parachute Brigade and Recces  
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Operation Savannah 
 
         Operation Savannah marked the first time that the South African military fought in a 
conventional campaign since the end of WWII. Operation Savannah was the supposedly covert 
SADF incursion into Angola to support the movements fighting against the MPLA, UNITA and 
the FNLA at the time. During the course of the operation the political situation changed rapidly 
with the introduction of Cuban ground forces in late 1975 as well as the US withholding their 
support for SA and essentially abandoning its unofficial ally in this conflict. Before going into 
further detail regarding the conflict, it is important to look at the roots of this operation.  
 As been mentioned previously, the social coup that erupted in Portugal during April 
1974, lay at the rout of this conflict. It was decided that Angola would become an independent 
nation on November 11th 1975 and that all Portuguese troops would be withdrawn by then as 
well. In the middle of 1975, Angola was engulfed in a full-blown civil war and by August 1975 
the MPLA had taken over control of most towns in central and southern Angola. The sides 
opposing the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA were in urgent need of foreign aid for which they 
went to SA and the US.  
 The Ruacana Falls located on the Kuene River is part of the top 10 largest water falls of 
the world. SA realized that this location had huge potential as being the site of a hydro-electric 
power plant ever since they had taken over SWA. It was in 1969 that SA and Portugal signed an 
agreement to develop a hydroelectric plant system, a massive project. By 1979 SA had invested 
R261 million into the plant and everything around it41. To ensure an adequate water level for the 
dam, especially in winter months when the water level was lower, storage dams were built 
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further up the river. One of these dams was located some 15 kilometers north of the Angolan – 
SWA border at a place called Calueque. Most of the construction took place in Angola however 
the electrical planet itself, with the exception of a 1, 5 kilometer water supply tunnel was located 
in SWA.  
 By 1974, the construction was well underway with construction carried out by workers 
from many different international countries. SWAPO had identified the location as a prime target 
and had told workers that they should either leave or getting the risk of being killed. Following 
the coup in Lisbon, Portuguese soldiers were withdrawn from Angola and the workers demanded 
that the SADF protected the area. In early August 1975 UNITA troops had harassed and robbed 
South African workers on their way home from the site. It was this event that persuaded South 
Africa to intervene militarily in Angola. By many this event was seen as an excuse for South 
Africa to intervene militarily however Pretoria intended for this intervention to be small scale 
and most importantly covert42.  
 On August 9th 1975, a SADF infantry platoon supported by a two armored cars moved 
into the area and secured it against the Angolan independence movements, which were quickly 
routed from the scene. A few days later South Africa negotiated with Portugal and proposed that 
Portugal would guard the area until the November 11th 1975 elections and that the SADF would 
continue to do so afterwards. Portugal was simply unable to do so and they suggested that the 
SADF should guard the area until the elections and then make a deal with whoever would win 
the elections in Angola43.  
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         General Viljoen, who was in command of the operation said the following about the 
operation: 
‘…It is true that South African involvement in the scheme was big and it’s true 
Ovamboland was very dependent on the water, and South West Africa on the electricity, 
but I must be honest, I always got the impression it was a handy way of explaining an 
operation that didn’t have the intention of protecting Calueque and Ruacana. It was a 
handy explanation to use to the rest of the world.44’   
 South Africa and the US began to covertly supply UNITA and FNLA in their struggle 
against the Soviet bloc backed MPLA beginning just before the SADF intervention. The 
American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was heavily involved as well ferrying in supplies 
with American planes which were later transferred to SADF planes to minimize the US presence.  
 Cuba also became heavily involved in Angola, its Communist leader at the time, Fidel 
Castro supported the MPLA based on the idea of ‘Internationalism’ as well as to raise the profile 
of Cuba in the Third World. It has long been suspected that Cuba was a mere proxy of the Soviet 
Union but research found this claim to be incorrect. Cuba decided to intervene in Angola 
independently of the Soviet Union, though most weapons and supplies were delivered by the 
Soviet Union. In the fall of 1975, significant numbers of Cuban regular forces began arriving 
with sophisticated Soviet weaponry and Cuban forces fought battles with the SADF45.  
 In September 1975, Pretoria finalized plans to invade Angola and to push back the 
MPLA in support of UNITA/FNLA. To accomplish this taskforce Zulu was formed, comprising 
of battle group Alpha (commanded by Commandant Delville) and Bravo (commanded by 
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Breytenbach). Breytenbach had three companies of FNLA troops under his command and the 
whole operation was designed   
 ‘in a way that would allow the SADF ‘plausible deniability’ – all signs of South African 
involvement had to be hidden, with troops wearing non-specific or former Portuguese 
uniforms and using Portuguese G3 and Belgian-made FN rifles. Their vehicles would be 
Land Rovers or vegetable trucks bought from Angolan refugees46.  
 On October 14th, both battle groups began their attacks northward into Angola, within 
two weeks Breytenbach’s Bravo Group had advanced all the way across Angola to reach the 
Atlantic Ocean at Moçâmedes and Porto Alexandre.  It was during the battle of Catengue on 
November 2nd 1975 that the Bravo Group encountered Cuban forces in battle for the first time.  
 On November 4th 1975, after the failure at Catengue Castro gave the order to commence 
Operation Carlota. During this clash at Catengue on November 2nd six Cubans were killed and it 
threw Luanda into panic47. Castro had to make a choice, to either to withdraw Cuba’s training 
personnel immediately to prevent further losses or to escalate the situation and commit thousands 
of regular forces. In the end Castro went for the latter option.  On the same day the first planes 
left for Luanda filled with troops. The first priority of Castro was to ensure that the MPLA could 
hold on to Luanda, the capital of Angola.  
 Contrary to public opinion at the time of the events, Castro launched operation Carlota 
on his own, without consent of the Soviet Union. Castro stated the following ‘We acted… but 
without (Soviet) cooperation. Quite the opposite, in fact48’  
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 In early November the situation was most dire for the MPLA, who had steadily been 
reinforced by thousands of Cuban soldiers flown in directly from Cuba.  
 By this time it also became clear to SA leadership in Pretoria that the capture of Luanda 
would be impossible by November 11th, Angola’s Independence Day. The SA cabinet was told 
that a 1,500 strong taskforce might suffer up to 40% casualties, if such an operation were to be 
carried out. Worried of suffering such heavy casualties Pretoria decided that Task Force Zulu 
should withdraw south while the SADF was still in a favorable military situation49.  
 On November 10th an ill-advised attack was launched by the FNLA against 
Quifangondo, just east of Luanda that ended in complete failure. The outdated SADF artillery 
were vastly outgunned by the superior Cuban BDM-21 rocket launchers and the promised SADF 
bombing took place from too high due to fear of casualties. By November 18, Task Force Zulu 
had travelled 3,159 kilometers and inflicted heavy casualties and suffered very few in return50.  
 On November 25th the SADF suffered its first military defeat during this operation at 
Ebo. A total of five SADF soldiers were killed and 11 were wounded during an ambush carried 
about by Cuban and MPLA forces. The following day a SADF spotter plane was also shot down 
over Ebo.  
 On December 9th the next major battle was fought at a bridge over the Nhia River, bridge 
14. Withdrawing Cuban forces had blown up this bridge to slow down the SADF advance on 
Quibala. During this battle the SADF was able to utilize their rather limited artillery very 
effectively using forward observers. During this battle, won by the SADF, 4 SADF members 
were killed as were roughly 400 Cuban/MPLA troops. For Cuba this was a heavy defeat, not 
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only in terms of personnel lost but also in terms of equipment. The SADF engineers who 
managed to repair the bridge were congratulated for their extreme bravery and adversity during 
this battle with many of them receiving awards for their actions. While the battle was a military 
victory, SA failed to capitalize on it due to divided leadership and in the end, arguably the 
greatest SADF victory of this operation, resulted neither in tactical nor strategic gain.  
 Pretoria ordered both task forces to halt any further advances and to consolidate their 
positions and postponed the decision to withdraw. In January 1976, Cuba launched a series of 
counter attacks forcing the FNLA south. On January 23rd 1976, the decision was finally made for 
the SADF to withdraw to SWA, at the time SADF forces numbered some 4,000 – 5,000, above 
the number initially sanctioned by Pretoria due to the Cuban intervention. By early February 
only a small rearguard was left in Angola to help UNITA maintain bases. On March 27th 1976 
the final SADF troops had left Angola51.  
 Without the support of the SADF in Angola the MPLA supported by Cuba was able to 
take over virtually all of Angola, with the exception of a small strip close to the SWA border. In 
the end Savannah was a failure for Pretoria, although it suffered ‘only’ 49 dead, the political 
costs were far greater. It was not until March 1976 that SA admitted it was fighting in Angola, 
which in the end was a failure in terms of how it should have handled the media. In November 
1975, it was already leaked to the press that SADF was fighting in Angola; Cuba used this as 
their justification to intervene. Another crucial aspect is that at the end of 1975 the US 
government and their forces on the ground, the CIA, withheld their support to South Africa. The 
US could not be seen openly aiding South Africa. By the end of Savannah Cuba had increased its 
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force from 1, 000 at the start of Savannah to more than 36,000 by the end of it52.  
 In conclusion however it must be remembered that Savannah was mostly a political 
failure, from a military prospective the SADF hardly lost any battles, it was mostly due to 
Pretoria’s failures that Savannah ended up as a failure. In the end the operation is best 
summarized by General Viljoen who stated that it was a ‘war of lost opportunities53’.  
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Operation Reindeer 
 
             A few years after operation Savannah South Africa launched its first cross border 
operation in 1978 seeking to gain the initiative in their fight against the SWAPO insurgency into 
SWA. The SADF knew the basic rules of an insurgency as stated by General Geldenhuys, 
General officer commanding SWA: 
 ‘The basic truth in an insurgency war is that the insurgent, potentially and often in 
practice, has the initiative… In a conflict situation the one who has the initiative seldom 
loses and we knew we had to find the way to seize and keep the initiative. One way to do 
this was to act first instead of waiting, by taking the battle to the insurgents54’  
The SADF thus came up with a plan to strike first at SWAPO in Angola before they 
would move in SWA. Operation Reindeer was the end result. It was a plan that consisted of three 
separate strikes into Angola. By 1978, SWAPO had established many bases close to the Angolan 
– SWA border, with their main headquarters located deeper into Angola. SWAPO knew that they 
were safe as the MPLA government backed them as well as Cuban military forces. SWAPO 
infiltration was becoming increasingly worrisome for the security situation in SWA55.  
 Until operation Reindeer the SADF had hardly ventured into Angola with the exception 
of small detachments of 32 Bn for reconnaissance or small attacks. The SADF was entirely 
structured in a defensive formation within SWA.  
       SADF leadership requested permission from Pretoria to venture in Angola and to neutralize 
SWAPO target before they could infiltrate into SWA. The operation consisted of three separate, 
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simultaneous attacks. The main target was named Alpha target ‘Moscow’ at Cassinga, a small 
town located some 250 km north of the SWA – Angola border. Alpha target was to be attacked 
by a force of 257 paratroopers under command of Commandant Jan Breytenbach56. SA 
intelligence had determined that SWAPO had established a major headquarters here consisting of 
a large recruitment training base, a logistics center as well as recuperation facilities57. It was 
estimated that some 1,500 SWAPO would be at this location, as well as numerous Cuban 
advisors and an unknown but significant number of civilians58.  
  Intelligence further observed that the Cassinga headquarters were responsible for 
orchestrating incursion into SWA from several bases close to the SWA – Angolan border. Two 
of such bases were also attacked. Target Bravo ‘Vietnam’ consisted of six bases some 30 
kilometers north of the SWA – Angola border, located at Chetequera. Target Bravo was attacked 
by units from the 2nd South African Infantry Bn, commanded by Commandent Frank Bestbier.  
 The last target, target Charlie, were several smaller bases located tot the east of 
Chetequera, which were to be assaulted by several companies of the 32 Bn, under command of 
Commandant Deon Ferreira. Prime Minister B.J. Vorster approved the overall plan and it was 
scheduled to take place on May 4th 1978, Ascension Day59.  
 Due to the nature of the operation and the danger involved for the SADF forces secrecy 
and effective planning were vital. A major concern for the attack on Cassinga was the location of 
a Cuban battalion some 16 kilometers away, as the source of a possible counter attack60. 
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Secondly the SADF forces would be outnumbered roughly five to one and thus a swift attack 
was key before SWAPO could mobilize to defend effectively.  
 The assault began at 08:00 with an airstrike, which was timed to coincide with the 
morning parade to attempt to maximize casualties. SADF bombers caused widespread damage 
and confusion amongst the SWAPO present. The paratroopers, even though they missed the drop 
zone by 1.5 kilometers, moved in quickly and managed to sweep the target with ease. Within a 
few hours Cassinga was declared secure and by early afternoon helicopters arrived to extract the 
paratroopers.  
 At roughly the same time the Cuban battalion had organized to come to the defense of 
Cassinga but they were attacked by SADF attack planes and their column was virtually 
annihilated. It is estimated that at least 100 Cubans were killed during this attack61. By the time 
that Cuban forces had arrived at Cassinga, the last SADF troops were leaving the area and by the 
evening the entire unit was safely back in SWA.  
 The SADF suffered three dead, eleven wounded and one Missing In Action (MIA), 
SWAPO suffered some 600 dead and 340 wounded62. The Cubans suffered at least 100 dead plus 
three tanks, seventeen armored personnel carriers, seven trucks and three anti-aircraft guns, 
according to SADF reports.  
 While the Cassinga raid, as it was later called, was a tremendous success, Operation 
Reindeer still consisted of two other components. Battle Group Juliet was to attack the SWAPO 
headquarters designated Vietnam and 32 Bn was to attack a total of 17 smaller bases located up 
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to 30 km north of the Angolan border63.  During the planning of the attack by the 32 Bn little 
intelligence was available on the targets ‘and a decision was made to focus on the ‘shallow’ 
target rather than going for deep penetration into unknown territory’64. This decision was made 
to minimize the risk of SADF casualties.  
 The attack by Battle Group Juliet was also underway on May 4th and highly successful 
with SADF suffering only two dead and sixteen wounded prior to their withdrawal back to SWA. 
In contrast SWAPO suffered some 250 dead and had 250 of their members captured by South 
African forces.  
 It was not until early morning on May 6th at 04:15 to be precise before the 32 Bn moved 
into Angola to commence their part of Operation Reindeer. The final plan was for 32 Bn to 
systematically destroy SWAPO bases, one after another65. 32 Bn’s attack started after an artillery 
assault on bases, and afterwards 32 Bn moved in to neutralize and destroy them. Initially 32 Bn 
operated without air support but it was decided that helicopters offered a much greater flexibility 
and effectiveness. During the planning no one had thought to inform the air force that helicopters 
would be required.  Initially after artillery shelling 32 Bn found several bases deserted as it took 
them too long to reach the bases after the artillery bombardments. The use of helicopters 
drastically reduced the time and as a result 32 Bn was able to engage SWAPO forces. On May 
6th, a tragic friendly fire event occurred when one 32 Bn member was killed and eighteen were 
wounded when artillery landed on the wrong coordinates. An inquiry later showed that improper 
maintenance was the cause for the friendly fire incident. On May 11th the final targets were 
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struck and by 10:00 on that day all 32 Bn member were back across the border in SWA. Records 
do not state how many casualties SWAPO suffered during the final phase of Operation Reindeer.  
 The final balance of this operation stands at roughly 10:00 SWAPO and Cuban dead, 
hundreds wounded and 250 captured as opposed to six South Africans dead, one MIA and thirty 
wounded. General Geldhuys stated the following about the attacks afterwards ‘The Cassinga 
attack was a jewel of military craftsmanship – and SWAPO knew it.66’ Operation Reindeer was 
the SADF’s most successful operation against SWAPO 
‘and inflicted losses in personnel and material from which SWAPO never recovered…a 
resounding success, shattering SWAPO’s Angolan infrastructure and delivering a 
devastating psychological blow.67’   
Politically speaking the attack was an enormous failure as SWAPO accused South Africa 
of attacking of what SWAPO quickly labelled as a ‘refugee camp’ where hundreds of ‘women 
and children were massacred’. To this very day the Cassinga raid remains the most controversial 
operation undertaken by the SADF. Afterwards the SADF did admit that some civilians were 
caught in the crossfire and were killed.  
‘Afterwards, at the debrief, paratroopers told in detail how these ‘refugees’ used 23mm 
anti-aircraft cannons in the ground role against them; how hundreds of ak-47 rifles were found 
next to bodies; and how the ‘refugees’ offered stiff resistance from extensive fortifications 
surrounding the village.68’  
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 The international outcry provided SWAPO, Cuba and Angola with a useful diversion on 
the real issue, how it was possible for the SADF to eliminate some of the most important 
SWAPO facilities this easily inside Angola and suffering so few casualties in the process. 
Interestingly enough the heavy Cuban losses are not mentioned in official reports who speak 
only of ‘light losses’, though officers who were there during the attack knew otherwise. 
Ultimately Operation Reindeer showed that South Africa was willing to strike first against 
SWAPO and it would do so again if required. Cuba’s forces were woefully unprepared 
defensively for an airborne attack as was carried out on May 4th 1978. SWAPO’s reputation was 
greatly affected and it would take years to recover from the damage suffered that day. Lastly and 
perhaps most importantly Operation Reindeer showed that Cuba’s forces would be sorely needed 
in Angola and could not be withdrawn starting in 1979 as was planned. At the end Cuban forces 
would stay in Angola for twelve more years, until 1991 when the final troops were brought back 
to Cuba69.  
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Operation Super 
 
 Starting in February 1982 SWAPO activity was detected in the till then relatively 
quiet western sector in Angola. Radio intercepts indicated that SWAPO might be attempting to 
infiltrate into SWA using the Kaokoveld70, the coastal desert that runs along northern SWA and 
southern Angola separating the inland from the Atlantic Ocean. This region is extremely rugged 
and ‘the rocky, hilly terrain makes mobile vehicular warfare almost impossible…Perhaps this 
factor induced SWAPO to attempt their infiltration here’71. There were two main reasons for 
SWAPO’s plan, firstly the SWAPO casualty rate when infiltrating through the Owamboland was 
ever increasing due to better security measures taken by the SADF and SAP. Secondly operating 
through the Kaokoveld ‘would stretch our resources and our defensive capabilities’72. This news 
greatly upset SA high command and they decided to send in a ten man Recce team to gather 
intelligence on the ground73.  
 From late February till the beginning of March 1982 several trucks had made their 
way from Cahama to Iona, a location some 30 kilometers north of the SWA – Angolan border. A 
SWAPO radio message intercepted on March 4th stating ‘Area cleared of all74’. This radio 
intercept got the SADF alarm bells ringing and on March 9th a ten man Recce team from the 5th 
regiment was flown into Angola by helicopter and dropped off some 20 kilometers east of Iona. 
At Marienfluss, just south of the Kunene River, dividing SWA from Angola, tactical 
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headquarters was set up under command of Captain Jan Hougaard. This detachment consisted of 
36 32 Bn members, two Puma transport helicopters, two Alouette gunships and were on standby 
as a reaction force75.  
 On the way to Iona the Recces planted some mines on the road leading from 
Moçâmedes and at 03:00 on March 10th a six vehicle convoy approached driving towards the 
south and the lead vehicle was knocked out by a mine. An airstrike was ordered by the SADF 
tactical headquarters but due to bad weather the planes were unable to take off. The five 
remaining vehicles split up, three turning back where they came from and the last two continuing 
southwards.  
 During the day the Recces had reached Iona and reported back to the tactical 
headquarters that the area was deserted but the Recces did find vehicle and human tracks heading 
south and the team decided to pursue them. Soon after three SWAPO were captured and shortly 
after 14:00 contact was made with a larger group of SWAPO consisting of 17 fighters. Alouette 
gunships and a 12 man reactionary force were brought in and not long after 14 SWAPO lay dead 
and 3 more were captured. The prisoners were brought back to the Marienfluss headquarters 
where they revealed, after interrogation, that 200 SWAPO were located at a base 10 kilometers 
south of Iona located in the Cambena valley76.  
 At the tactical headquarters, planning began immediately to launch an attack on the 
SWAPO camp to be launched at 12:00 on March 12th. Captain Hougaard would lead the attack. 
The attack force would consist of 45 men from 32 Bn Delta Company, three 12 man stopper 
groups (units designed to cut off an enemy’s retreat) and a 12 man mortar group. A 36 men 
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reserve unit remained on standby at Marienfluss. The air component would consist of five Puma 
helicopters for transport and four Alouette gunships. Soon after takeoff however heavy rain had 
reduced visibility to almost zero and the attack had to be postponed until the next morning 
07:3077.   
 The assault force had been very close to the base by the time it was called off and 
back at the SADF headquarters officers were worried that SWAPO had abandoned the base and 
fled. Headquarters wanted to call off the second attack but Captain Hougaard was convinced that 
the base would still be operational and wanted to launch a second attempt, in the end Hougaard 
turned out to be right78.  
 The attack was launched after the gunships over the base, which was large, measuring 
1,000 by 1,500 meters. Initially the gunship pilots could not spot the enemy, as they had 
camouflaged themselves well, attempting to blend in amongst rocks and small bushes. It was 
only after SWAPO fired up the gunships that crews realized the enemy was right below them79. 
Under Alouette gunship cover the 45 men from the 32 Bn were landed only 50 meters away from 
the base and commenced their assault.  
 The mortar group was deployed on the high ground to deliver fire support, it turned 
out that the base was manned by 300 SWAPO, and not 200 as the SWAPO prisoner had claimed. 
The 32 Bn troops were thus outnumbered roughly 7:1, and normal doctrine calls for a superiority 
of 3:1 when attacking an enemy. The gunships were utilized as so-called ‘force multiplier’ (a 
capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the 
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combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission 
accomplishment)80. Soon after the attack began, one of the stopper groups was also relocated to 
an attempt to even out the odds, though the 32 Bn troops remained heavily outnumbered81.  
 SWAPO had made a grave error in the location of their base, which was established in 
a narrow valley, with high ground on all sides and it lacked a clear escape route. The landscape 
itself seemed lunar, consisting mostly of rocks, small bushes and high cliffs. SWAPO were 
continuously under attack from the gunships which caused SWAPO very heavy losses. SWAPO 
sought to shoot down the Alouettes using SAM-7’s but due to the very low altitude the gunships 
were flying at the missiles failed to lock on, and they did not possess proximity fuses82.  
 The fighting lasted roughly till 15:00 by which time the 32 Bn troops had nearly run 
out of ammunition but by then the base had been mostly cleared of resistance. The exhausted 32 
Bn troops were gravely concerned of a SWAPO counter attack during the night originating from 
the north, but fortunately for them no such attack materialized83.  
 In the morning additional 32 Bn troops arrived to assist with the final mopping up. 
Captured documents revealed that the SWAPO troops at this base had been ordered to establish 
supply caches in the Kaokoveld in anticipation of SWAPO infiltrations and attacks into SWA. A 
lot of weapons and equipment were seized, including RPG launchers, machine guns, dozens or 
files as well as many rounds of ammunition. In addition thousands of kilos of food were 
confiscated and brought back to SWA84.   
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 Operation Super was a tremendous success for the SADF, and it was only named 
Super two days after the base had been attacked. The SADF had managed to put a hold on 
SWAPO plans to infiltrate into SWA through the Kaokoveld. During this attack SWAPO losses 
amounted to 201 dead and 7captured. 32 Bn had 3 men killed and 5 wounded, given the number 
of SWAPO they faced it is remarkable how few casualties they had suffered. 32 Bn members 
were quick to thank the gunships for their outstanding support during the attack and believed 
they deserved a lot of praise for their efforts during this operation. 
  The SWAPO base was completely destroyed and it was never attempted again by 
SWAPO to infiltrate into SWA through the Kaokoveld. Captain Hougaard received personal 
congratulations from South Africa’s Prime Minister, P.W. Botha afterwards for this outstanding 
victory. 5 men who had taken part in the operation were awarded the Honoris Crux, South 
Africa’s highest medal, for their services, these men were Captain Ellis, Sergeant Stephen 
Coetzee, Second Lieutenant Petrus Nel, Temporary Sergeant Victor Dracula and lastly Rifleman 
Bernardo Domingos85.  
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Operation Askari 
 
 
 In 1981 the SADF carried out operation Protea which successfully neutralized 
SWAPO in southern Angola in a massive conventional attack. By the end of 1983, SA 
intelligence reports suggested that SWAPO had sufficiently recovered from this major setback86. 
SWAPO was preparing for major infiltrations in early 1984 and the SADF decided to 
prematurely attack SWAPO in Angola. The aim of the operation was ‘to prevent a SWAPO 
Special Forces incursion to the south87’.  A complex plan was decided upon, the end result being 
called operation Askari. 
   Operation Askari was initially scheduled to commence in early November but this 
was delayed due to negotiations by SA foreign minister Pik Botha in Rome regarding SWA. 
Operation Askari would consist of four phases which were designed around the following 
general guidelines for this operation: 
a. ‘The enemy must be stopped externally 
b. Deep reconnaissance coupled to offensive actions must be commenced at an early stage 
c. Maximum use of mobile elements for follow-ups must be made 
d. Security forces must operate pro-actively, not re-actively 
e. Security forces must maintain the initiative 
f. An infiltration during 1984 must simply not take place. Not even 10 terrorists must 
successfully infiltrate88’ 
                                                          
86 Nortje, Piet,32 Battalion, 2003, p193 
87 Lord, Dick, From Fledging to Eagle, 2008, p300 
88 Lord, R, Operation Askari,1992, Vol 22, Nr 4, p2 
50 
 
 These outlines were straightforward with the exception of guideline f, which was 
completely impractical and should not have been included for this operation. The four phases of 
this operation were as follows: 
‘Phase 1: Deep reconnaissance by Special Forces followed by a SAAF (South African Air Force) 
attack on the “Typhoon”/Volcano” base close to Lubango between 1 November and 30 
December 1983. 
Phase 2: Offensive reconnaissance/isolation of Cahama, Mulonodo and Cuvelai from 16 
November to mid-January 1983. The aim being, to cut enemy communications and logistics lines 
in the deep area and to terrorise and demoralize FAPLA to such an extent that they would 
withdraw. 
Phase 3: To establish a dominated area from west of the Cunene River, through Quiteve, Mupa, 
Vinticet, eastwards through londe, by the beginning of Feb 1984.  
Phase 4: The final stopping of the incursion, internally if necessary.89’  
 There was however a major problem for the SADF right from the outset of this 
operation: ‘because of the possible political consequences, though, they were given severe 
limitations. They were prohibited from launching direct attacks against any of the targets90’.   
The entire operation was designed from the beginning with the political consequences in mind 
yet to the SADF it meant that they were unable to carry out this operation as they would have 
liked nonetheless they simply had to carry out their orders as outlined in the operational plan.  
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 Opposition consisted of SWAPO who were supported by FAPLA (Angolan armed 
forces). A number of towns were heavily fortified with AAA (anti-aircraft artillery), SAM 
(surface to air missiles), ground artillery and machine guns. Cuban ground forces were not found 
in the immediate vicinity except for a few advisors, as it was Castro’s policy to not:  
‘…deploy substantial formation sin areas where they might become pitted against the 
SADF…The Cuban’s main fighting strength was in Luanda. At the time of Operation 
Askari they posed a potential rather than an actual threat to the South Africans.91’    
 The operation got underway in early December 1983 with the deployment of 5 Recce 
teams of various sizes, the largest Recce deployment of the entire war. ‘They were deployed 
west of Cahama, east of Cahama, in the vicinity of Mulondo, in the outskirts of Cuvelai and were 
also tasked to reconnoiter the Lubango area92’.  
  The Recces were handed a difficult task but in general had managed to do well in 
acquiring tactical intelligence which was utilized to prepare for the remaining phases of 
operation Askari. The main target of phase one, a SWAPO training facility at Lubango was 
struck at 09:20 by SAAF bombers. This strike was a success and the SAAF suffered no losses.  
 On December 6th  the main assault was launched, consisting of four mechanized battle 
groups each of roughly 500 men supported by air strikes and Recce teams93. The main effort was 
launched towards Cuvelai with diversionary attacks on Cahama and Caiundo. The 32 Bn was 
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sent to Cassinga where 32 Bn reconnaissance teams had begun operation as early as November 
26th as part of Operation Askari94.  
 Phase 2 began with an assault on the town of Chama, a well-defended town manned 
by the FAPLA 2nd Brigade. The SADF 61 Mechanized Bn assisted by artillery was given the 
task to occupy the town. Firstly two Recce teams sought to neutralize FAPLA logistics between 
Cahama and Chimemba while SAAF strikes struck targets within Chama95. On December 16th 
the encirclement of Chama began and SAAF bombings plus artillery began to pound Chama 
around the clock. Intelligence obtained indicated that the morale of the 2nd Brigade at Chama was 
falling due to the SA pressure and it appeared as if the SADF plan was working. By the end of 
December 1983 however, international pressure had reached a point where all efforts had to be 
called off at Cahama and the 61 Bn was withdrawn. This was a grave mistake by SA leadership 
‘maintenance of the aim is a fundamental principle of war. All the effort put into the Cahama 
operation was not only wasted, it reinforced the enemies morale96’.  
 Two further unsuccessful diversionary attacks took place at the towns of Mulondo and 
Ciundo. The Mulondo assault was called off in early January 1984 for the same reasons as the 
Cahama operation. Ciundo was different. Originally it was never part of the Askari plan and in 
the end its addition was a poor choice and the town was not taken, despite a concerted effort over 
the period of three weeks.  
 The main effort of Askari was directed at the town of Cuvelai, which hosted a large 
SWAPO training facility97. This base was located 5 kilometers from the town itself and the 
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assault began on January 3rd 1984. The SAAF began bombarding the base and a radio intercept 
indicated that the air strikes were successful ‘Seventy-five per cent of my artillery has been taken 
out by the South African Air Force98’.  
 The SAAF played an important role in the capture of this town flying many sorties 
with both fixed wing planes as well as helicopters providing support to the advancing SADF 
ground troops. Cuvelai was surrounded by many minefields and together with the heavy rainfall, 
the SADF advance bogged down. When SADF forces finally reached the base they discovered 
that both SWAPO and FAPLA had vacated the area, fleeing north99. A substantial number of 
these troops fleeing north ended up being captured by 32 Bn stopper groups who were deployed 
further north.  
 SWAPO and FAPLA were aided during this four day battle by two Cuban battalions 
and at the end of the day the fighting at Cuvelai was the deadliest confrontation during Operation 
Askari and accounted for 21 out of the 24 dead suffered by the SADF during Askari. SWAPO, 
FAPLA and Cub lost 324 men and 11 T-55 tanks, 14 armored cars. The SADF also captured an 
intact SAM-9 system100101. 
 On January 10th the decision was made to put a halt to all SADF forces involved in 
Askari due to international pressure. Operation Askari was finished and it was regarded as a 
success by the SADF. Between December 1983 and January the SADF suffered 32 fatalities 
compared to 407 of the enemy, a ratio of 13:1102. In addition to vast human casualties scores of 
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weapons and supplies were captured at Cuvelai and sent back to South Africa. Nonetheless, on 
the whole the operation failed in its main aim. 
 ‘The overall aim of Askari, however, was to prevent an infiltration to the south in 
1984. Five hundred and fifty-five terrorists were killed during 1984 in addition to 
those who died during Askari, indicating that although they suffered losses the pattern 
of insurgency war continued. We failed to achieve the main aim103’.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 Lord, Dick, From Fledging to Eagle, 2008, p318 
55 
 
Koevoet Operations 1979 – 1989 
 
 As has been mentioned in the introduction of this unit Koevoet was a highly specialized 
SAP counter insurgency unit. It operated in northern SWA and many times into Angola but it 
was not under the jurisdiction of the SADF. There would be many occasions when Koevoet 
would clash with the SADF and the top SADF Generals who would command the SWA theatre 
did not think highly of Koevoet.  
 ‘I could never agree with the methods of Koevoet.’ said General Viljoen ‘They had a 
cruelty about them that certainly didn’t further the hearts and mind of the people.104’  
 Another General, General Meiring stated the following about Koevoet: ‘Koevoet was not 
a law unto itself, Koevoet was just unto itself.105’  
 In the unit introduction, it was also stated that during their 10 year period directly in the 
frontline it took part in more than 1600 contacts with the enemy. It is out of the scope of this 
paper to discuss all these contacts and engagements. Instead this section will analyze exactly 
how Koevoet operated and will conclude with looking at the unit’s final operation, in which the 
unit successfully repelled a surprise SWAPO invasion of SWA in April 1989.  
 Koevoet was initially established as an intelligence gathering tool for the Recces. The 
aim was to gather intelligence and provide trackers for the SADF who would then proceed to 
take out targets when the intelligence was deemed correct. It was soon determined that the 
reaction time was too slow. Initially by the time the operations were approved and about to be 
carried out by the Recces it was often too late. General Dreyer insisted on a special police unit 
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that combined intelligence gathering with its own paramilitary reaction units. As was to be 
expected, the SADF was highly skeptical of Dreyer’s plans and stated remarks such as:  
‘How the hell can you succeed when we have failed? And what about your COIN units? 
They haven’t exactly been the greatest success in history’.  
Dreyer replied with ‘Well, we’ll see won’t we.106’  
The addition of Koevoet’s own reaction force was extremely important to their success, their 
reaction time was almost zero and they were able to immediately engage enemies once they had 
picked up their trails.  
‘The new reaction force was a tremendous success, engaging in thirty-six contacts in its 
first ninety days of operation. It didn't take long for Koevoet to become well-known 
throughout the operational area. During its first year of operation, Koevoet killed 511 
PLAN terrorists while losing only twelve of its own men.107’  
  While having its own reaction force was a big part of the success of Koevoet its true 
secret of success was its relationship with the local population in the area that it operated in. 
Roughly 90% of Koevoet members came from the Owamboland, the part of SWA bordering 
Angola, which was also the region where Koevoet was stationed.  
‘The secret of Koevoet’s success is working with and relying on timely information from 
the local population in the operational area. The information they get is up to date and 
obtained through normal police work. Their approach to counterinsurgency is that it is 
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essentially normal police work involving a lot of combat and that it is not warfare in the 
normal military sense.  Koevoet, like SWATF’s 101 Battalion, also uses the principle of 
setting a thief to catch a thief by employing former terrorists to catch PLAN 
infiltrators.  About a quarter of the Koevoet trackers were ex-PLAN terrorists. Not only 
do they pursue their former comrades with the zeal of the converted, but their knowledge 
and use is invaluable due to their uncanny insight into the likely movements and reactions 
of the hunted PLAN groups. They would follow a trail to a conclusion no matter where it 
took them. Koevoet was not restricted by battalion, company or military sector 
boundaries. It was not unusual for Koevoet groups to chase their target back and forth 
through Owamboland, over the border into Angola and to catch them near FAPLA bases 
some distance into Angola.108’  
The paragraph above taken from a website created by Koevoet veterans describes exactly 
what made Koevoet so effective especially in terms of intelligence gathering as well as their 
procedures.  
The men who made up the vast majority of Koevoet were regarded by many as the finest 
trackers in the entire world. Tracking refers to the ability to locating people or animals based on 
the tracks, footprints, waste, trash that they leave behind while moving. The Owambos were 
regarded as second to none and their exploits in Koevoet reflected their talents.  
When it came to engaging enemies, Koevoet operated in two different ways depending 
on the number of enemies that they faced. Single or small groups of SWAPO were pursued by 
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trackers on the ground with Casspirs (heavily armored mine resistant ant personnel carriers) 
would secure either flank.  
Larger groups of SWAPO would be pursued by Casspirs rather than by trackers on foot 
as these vehicles allowed for much greater firepower, maneuverability and being heavily 
armored which gave much better protection to Koevoet personnel. In addition making heavy use 
of vehicles made it a lot easier to identify friends or foe, given that SWAPO would also be on 
foot and never using vehicles while attempting to infiltrate into SWA. Another important point 
regarding ethnicity is explained below.  
‘In general, Koevoet personnel came from the ethnic group in which area the Koevoet 
team would be operating.  Owambo’s work in Ovamboland, Kavango’s in Kavangoland, 
etc. .... However, the groups are not made up exclusively of sub tribes within the main 
tribal area.  They are usually mixed so that each group will have at least one or two men 
from each area that will be familiar with its terrain, people, dialect and customs. 
This procedure is similar to having policemen patrol the neighborhoods they grew up in-
they know it and the people living in it.109’  
1988 – 1989 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, adopted on September 29, 1978, called 
for a cease-fire and elections that were to be supervised by the UN in SWA, which led to an 
independent Namibia. Furthermore a UN advisory group UNITAG (United Nations Transition 
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Assistance Group) would be established to observe the elections and the complete South African 
withdrawal from the country110.  
South Africa refused to implement this resolution until Cuba would agree to withdraw its 
large contingent of soldiers out of Angola. It was not until more than 10 years after the initial 
vote, December 22nd 1988 when South Africa agreed to implement this treaty when it signed to 
Tripartite Accord. This treaty signed by South Africa, Cuba and Angola granted full 
independence to Namibia and called for the complete withdrawal of both South African and 
Cuban forces from SWA and Angola respectively.  Namibia was to become independent on 
March 21st 1990.  
April 1st 1990 
On this day United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 was to be officially 
implemented. Before this date the SADF had already withdrawn nearly all its forces back to 
South Africa and the local SWATF (South West Africa Territorial Force) had nearly been 
dissolved. Koevoet was also supposed to be dissolved as part of the implementation of 
Resolution 435. On this day defensive responsibility fell upon the SWA police and no longer on 
the SADF.  
SWAPO fighters were also supposed to be in their bases awaiting demobilization, the 
reality was very different though. In the months leading up to the April 1st 1989 there were 
rumors that SWAPO was not following the agreement that was signed and was in fact preparing 
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for a final assault on SWA, to take place on April 1st 1989. South African intelligence apparently 
did not take this threat seriously and continued to carry out their part of the resolution as planned.  
SWAPO began infiltrating into SWA during the night of March 31st 1989 with a force of 
some 1500 – 1800 fighters. On March 31st 1989 a few SWA police patrols picked up tracks of 
these SWAPO infiltrators and the police authorities and the SADF were immediately notified of 
the threat. The UNITAG force in place was not able to contain the situation and it was decided 
that South Africa would reactivate its troops to neutralize the threat.  
Operation Merlyn 
  South Africa quickly formed a plan called Merlyn and the aim was ‘to stop the SWAPO’s 
infiltration into SWA at the implementation of Resolution 435 on April 1 1989.’  
‘By early morning on 1 April, it was clear SWAPO had violated every clause of the 
settlement and had launched the largest incursion of the entire war. Around 1,500 heavily 
armed SWAPO terrorists had crossed the border.111’   
 The first radio reports from SWA police were thought of as April fool’s jokes but it was 
not long until the reality was confirmed by a Koevoet officer. ‘Negative, negative...  This is no 
April fool’s joke…this is for real. We are dealing with a serious situation here.112’  
 The SAAF was alerted but at the time, due to Resolution 435, the number of helicopters 
and planes that were on alert was almost zero. In the next few days dozens of helicopters were 
ferried in directly from South Africa along with ammunition, as this had already been shipped 
back.  
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Koevoet bore the brunt of the fighting which was heaviest during the first nine days. On 
the first day the situation was most desperate for the South Africans and initially the SAAF 
helicopter pilots did not have clearance to aid the troops on the ground, due to restrictions in 
place because of Resolution 435113. Fortunately for Koevoet the restriction was soon lifted when 
the extent of the SWAPO invasion became fully known.  
Koevoet responded in their usual professionalism and were largely responsible for 
successfully repelling the invasion. During the first 9 days of the invasion they killed 294 
SWAPO and captured 14, in addition several hundreds were wounded. By comparison, the 
SADF killed another 18 and captured 26 SWAPO. The SA security forces suffered 125 
casualties, of which 25 died, 20 of these were Koevoet114. A total of 21 police vehicles had also 
been destroyed or disabled.  
While the heaviest fighting had seized on April 9th, it would take another few weeks of 
sporadic fighting before operation Merlyn was deemed over. SWAPO’s surprise invasion had 
failed at a terrible cost.  
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Battle of Cuito Cuanavale 
 
Introduction 
 The battle of Cuito Cuanavale remains a controversial point in history, even today more 
than 20 years after it took place. It was a battle where both sides claimed victory. At an ANC 
conference in December 2007 the following was said about this battle  
 ‘the 20th anniversary of the defeat of the SADF at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which 
marked a turning point in the Apartheid war…and providing impetus to the process that led to 
the negotiated end of Apartheid115’. 
 General Geldenhuys insists that ‘We (SADF) did not attack Cuito Cuanavale. The central 
highlands and the Benguela railway line were not in our planning at anytime whatever116’.  
  This battle is marked by many myths and also marked heavily by propaganda, Cuba and 
Angola easily won the propaganda war. Given South Africa’s political situation and its isolated 
position in the world this was not surprising. However it must also be said that the political 
leadership in Pretoria underestimated the power of propaganda in the eyes of the international 
community.   
 In order to give the best possible understanding of the battle, a variety of sources will be 
used, ranging from Cuban, Angolan, Russian, neutral and of course South African. Many sources 
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are contradictory in parts nonetheless the utmost care was utilized to try to ensure the best 
possible narrative for the reader.  
Background to Cuito Cuanavale 
In 1984 the MPLA – Cuban – Soviet alliance were starting preparations for what they 
saw was the final assault to wipe out UNITA and take over Angola entirely. Cuba increased its 
troop strength in Angola to more than 31,000 by the end of 1985, with additional troops still to 
arrive. In addition more than 3,500 advisors/technical staff mainly from East Germany and the 
USSR were also in Angola to help the MPLA and Cuba operate the sophisticated weaponry that 
the USSR was bringing to the country. More than $1 billion of USSR weapons entered Angola 
between 1984 and 1985 according to Western intelligence reports117.  
On September 2nd 1985, the MPLA launched the largest attack to date against UNITA. 
The main objective of the attack was to capture Mavinga, UNITA’s main logistical center, and to 
then move on to UNITA’s headquarters at Jamba. It quickly became apparent that UNITA was 
unable to hold back the attack and Pretoria decided that the SADF had to intervene or risk the 
complete collapse of UNITA.  
It was decided that the SAAF would be fully mobilized and it was used to great effect to 
attack the MPLA continuously. On the ground the SADF placed only a few companies to aid the 
UNITA and help organize the air assault. According to radio intercepts the MPLA suffered 4,719 
casualties due to the SAAF118. Soon afterwards SADF artillery was also brought into position 
and together with the SAAF efforts the attack, called operation Congresso II was soon spent. 
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‘The FAPLA sustained nearly 2,500 casualties, losing more than a dozen aircraft, thirty-
two armored vehicles and over 100 trucks… the soviet lost ten killed and nine wounded while 
the Cubans… suffered fifty-six killed and sixty wounded, their heaviest loss since the ‘Cassinga 
Raid’ seven years before. UNITA lost 500 killed and 1,500 wounded… and only just managed to 
hold onto Mavinga thanks to the last-minute South African intervention119’.   
The USSR was becoming ever more impatient, especially after Gorbachev took over as 
the leader of the USSR early March 1985. He decided that the USSR needed to reform and 
change its policies both economically and politically. In December 1985 one of the USSR’s top 
Generals, General Konstantin Shaganovitch arrived in Angola to take command of all forces 
located there, including the Angolan armed forces. Shaganovitch was the highest Soviet General 
to be deployed outside of Europe or Afghanistan, he was highly regarded in Afghanistan and 
regarded as a counter-insurgency expert120.  
The losses sustained during the offensive were immense and it would take a long time for 
the MPLA to recover from them. The USSR brought even more equipment in during the winter 
of 1985/1986 to launch another offensive in 1986. This offensive too became a colossal failure 
 ‘For the Cubans, the failure of a second consecutive offensive was deeply demoralizing, 
and the mounting Cuban casualties aggregated the discontent brewing in the army, leading to 
several senior officers to conclude that the war in Angola was a lost cause121’.  
Castro remained optimistic that the war could still be won and proclaimed that ‘Cuban 
forces would remain in Angola until the end of apartheid if necessary122’.  
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Planning for Operation Saludando Octubre 
In early 1987, planning got underway for what was to be the Soviet’s last attempt to win 
the war military in Angola; the main goals were the same as in the previous two years. Firstly 
Mavinga was to be captured followed by a final assault on the UNITA headquarters at Jamba.  
‘Employing at least 10,000 troops and an additional $1,5 billion of Soviet equipment – 
including 150 T-55 and T-62 tanks, Hind helicopters gun-ships (upgraded Mi-24’s) and M-46 
and D-30 guns… Once again, however the Soviet failed to make contingency plans for a South 
African intervention.123’  
This massive military buildup took place near the town of Cuito Cuanavale. The town 
itself was small yet of strategic importance due to its geographic position and due to the location 
of a large military airbase just west of town.  
The Soviet were warned of a possible South African intervention but they inexplicably 
decided to ignore these warnings, despite the heavy setbacks of the two previous years.  
‘…it appears that they were confident that the colossal military force concentrating in 
Cuito Cuanavale would see off any opposition and, dismissing Cuban and Angolan warnings, 
they went ahead with their greatest gamble of the war.124’  
The massive preparation did not go unnoticed by the South Africans who, as early as 
March 1987, had warned UNITA that a massive attack was to be launched in the near future. 
Initially there was no response from UNITA, it was only after diversionary attacks were 
launched by FAPLA in April that UNITA began to take the South African warnings seriously. In 
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May UNITA launched a few attacks designed to disrupt supply lines around Cuito Cuanavale but 
it soon became clear to Pretoria that this was not enough, given the massive Cuban, FAPLA 
military buildup125.  
Pretoria initiates covert aid, June 15th 1987 
After the initial intelligence reports arrived in South Africa, Pretoria was caught in a big 
dilemma. It was clear that a major offensive was to take place soon yet the question remained 
how South Africa would react. SADF leadership recommended a large attack from SWA to 
attack the rear of Cuito Cuanavale. This approach was considered and then rejected as Pretoria 
knew it could not hide such an attack from the international community126.  
Instead a program of covert aid began including Recces, small anti-tank teams and 
artillery in addition to logistic support to help out UNITA. Pretoria had hoped that this type of 
support would remain small in scale and hopefully covert as well. It would not be long however 
before the fighting escalated beyond all expectations and a different approach was required to 
prevent the situation from worsening127.  
Pretoria and the SADF formulated a new plan that called for an attack through the south 
east of Angola, the parts controlled by UNITA:  
‘..into an area east of the Cuito River in order to prevent FAPLA from capturing 
Mavinga. Mavinga held no importance as a town…But nearby, on a plateau…was an important 
airfield at which heavy transport planes delivered South African and American supplies and 
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weapons. If that were to fall, then FAPLA forces would be free to advance some 250 km to 
Jamba, UNITA bush capital in the south-eastern corner of Angola…128’  
Soviets commence the offensive, July/August 1987 
By early July 1987, 8 entire FAPLA brigades had gathered at Cuito Cuanavale. 4 of these 
brigades would advance towards Mavinga while the others would guard the flanks and provide 
logistical support. General Shaganovitch split his forces into 2 groups, 2 brigades would secure 
the Lomba River (which is located roughly 30 kilometers north of Mavinga) from the south, so 
the other 2 brigades could cross it, before the entire force would advance to capture Mavinga.  
 ‘Within days however of the offensive’s launch, however, the leading brigade were 
bogged down fighting around the source of the Chambinga River (twenty miles east of Cuito 
Cuanvale). Determined to avoid a repeat of the previous year’s stillborn offensive, the Soviets 
halted the advance… - and fresh plans were drawn up to resume the offensive in August, 
prompting the now inevitable South African response129’.  
Operation Moduler 
 ‘Recognizing that UNITA could not face the renewed FAPLA threat on its own, on 4 
August the SADF launched what was to prove its most controversial intervention of the war: 
Operation Moduler.130’  
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The SADF plan to counter the threat was going to be combined operation to utilize all 
components of the security forces as effectively as possible. The aims of Operation Moduler 
were as follows: 
 Watch and harass FAPLA forces when they deploy 
 Monitor and harass the FAPLA force as it advances 
 Halt the advance of FAPLA on Mavinga 
 Destroy the FAPLA forces involved131 
The SADF gathered a small force initially consisting of 700 troops, mostly gathered from 
the 32 Bn, a few Recce teams, some artillery units and some anti-aircraft artillery troops. This 
was called 20 Brigade even though in reality the force amounted to less than a full battalion.  By 
late August this force was reinforced by additional elements from the 61 Mechanized Battalion 
Group, heavy mortars and more artillery, including the highly regarded G-5 artillery.  
‘But even with this reinforcement, the South African force in Angola never exceeded     
3,000 men. 20 Brigade’s small size (initially fewer than 1,000 against at least 6,000 FAPLA 
troops) is illustrative of the contrasts Pretoria put on the SADF in its attempt to keep Operation 
Moduler clandestine, an unlikely outcome when all previous South African interventions had 
been uncovered with weeks.132’ 
 In late August 1987, a Recce team launched a daring attack behind enemy lines to 
destroy a bridge over the Cuito River. Despite being attacked by a far superior forces the Recces 
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managed to damage the bridge sufficiently for it to be deemed unusable by their enemy. The loss 
of this bridge caused considerable logistics problems for the attacking Angolan forces133.  
 It is important to note that the capture of Cuito Cuanavale is not mentioned in the 
SADF planning ‘The crucial question of when South African forces should withdraw (or whether 
they should advance and capture Cuito Cuanavale) was left undecided134’.  
August 14th 1987 
 On August 14th 1987 General Shaganovitch gives the order to move five FAPLA 
brigades to the Lomba River and to make preparations to cross it as the first step towards 
Mavinga. The assault went underway from two sides and the SADF realized they had to prevent 
the attempted pincer movement or risk losing Mavinga. Initially the SADF was unable to prevent 
the repeated attacks, 20 Brigade (700) men was simply insufficient to hold back thousands of 
FAPLA and heavy equipment. It was after this attack that significant SADF reinforcement were 
authorized by Pretoria. In addition the SAAF began a bombing campaign against the FAPLA 
brigades that was very effective.  
The battle of the Lomba River September 1987 
 At the beginning of September 1987, a turning point took place during the month long 
battle of the Lomba River. The fighting here was some of the fiercest of the entire war and it 
pitted a small SADF force against three FAPLA brigades. The SADF 20 Brigade received heavy 
G-5 artillery support, Cuban plans sent to destroy them were unable to locate these guns due to 
excellent camouflage plus warnings from Recce teams located close to airbases in Angola. The 
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SADF used anti-tank missiles located on armored personnel carriers to great effect and knocked 
out many vehicles whilst suffering very light casualties in return. By September 27th 1987, the 
Soviet military advisors who had led this assault were pulled out and the FAPLA units were left 
without a command element135.  
Destruction of 47 Brigade 
 At the end of September Pretoria had decided that objectives of Operation Moduler 
were to be changed to a counter attack and to attempt to neutralize all FAPLA force east of the 
Cuito River136.  
 On October 3rd the SADF 61 Mechanized Bn, supported by UNITA, counterattacked 
the FAPLA 47 Brigade with a force of Ratel armored personnel carriers. By 5 PM on the same 
day the 47 Brigade was in full retreat having lost 127 vehicles, destroyed or abandoned. It was 
South Africa’s biggest battle since the end of WWII. In addition the SADF captured a fully intact 
SAM-8 system, a world premiere. During the battle FAPLA suffered 600 casualties as opposed 
to 1 SADF killed and 1 Ratel destroyed137.  
The battle of Cuito Cuanavale  
  General Shagnovitch ordered a general withdrawal in the direction of Cuito Cuanavale 
itself. Pretoria ordered the SADF to pursue the enemy and authorized the deployment of tanks 
for the first time during the war plus more G-5 and even G-6 (self-propelled G-5 artillery) 
artillery units. On October 14th 1987, the siege of Cuito Cuanavale was launched when G-5 
artillery knocked out a FAPLA command post. According to Cuban/Angolan sources this date 
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commenced the 7 month long siege of Cuito Cuanavale. By November the situation had 
deteriorated sufficiently for Castro himself to intervene and he took personal charge of the 
situation.  
 Castro ordered Cuba’s finest soldiers to defend Cuito Cuanvale including his personal 
elite 50th division. Cuba’s best pilots and Special Forces were brought into Angola. In addition 
Cuba sent thousands of troops to Cuene, close to the SWA/Angolan border, a move which 
greatly worried Pretoria138.  
 ‘By Christmas, Fidel Castro was starting to feel the heat. Fearing a military 
catastrophe, he ordered Cuban diplomats and MPLA officials at the United Nations to contact 
the South African UN mission in New York to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement 
in Angola. He suggested that such an agreement should be linked to a settlement in Namibia – 
exactly what the South Africans had been calling for years.139’  
 SADF leadership wanted to launch a final attack on Cuito Cuanavale itself but Pretoria 
decided against this, due to the negotiations and wanted to allow Cuba a ‘face-saving way of 
withdrawing from the conflict140’. It was decided that the SADF was to attack to the east of Cuito 
Cuanavale in attempt to force FAPLA back across the Cuito River and by doing so it would exert 
sufficient pressure on Cuba to increase the rate of the negotiations.  
 International pressure began to mount on South Africa with the UN Security Council 
demanding the SADF to leave Angola, to which Pretoria responded that it would only go when 
Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola would be removed.   
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 On February 14th the first tank battle of the war took place which pitted Cuban tanks 
versus South African ones. At the end of this one day battle Angolan and Cuban forces suffered a 
crushing defeat with FAPLA suffering more than 500 killed, Cuban 32 killed and dozens of 
vehicles knocked out. SADF losses were just 4 killed and 7 wounded.  
 In the spring of 1988, the SADF launched several assaults to clear FAPLA east of the 
Cuito River, but given the size of the opposition and their own limited resources they were 
unable to accomplish this, despite inflicting very heavy casualties. Early 1988, Cuban troop 
levels were at their highest point of the whole war, with some 52,000 Cuban troops stationed in 
Angola141. Throughout February and March 1988, the SADF launched a series of assault against 
formidable defense positions and were unable to dislodge FAPLA and heavy Cuban forces 
entrenched in them without suffering unacceptable levels of casualties. Further attacks from the 
east were called off and attacks from the west, which would have been far easier, as originally 
requested by the SADF, were again denied by Pretoria142.  
Conclusion of the ‘siege’ of Cuito Cuanavale 
 In April the 3,000 strong SADF force was replaced by a smaller 1,500 strong group 
whose primary task was to aid the SADF plan to create large minefields and to commence a 
campaign of deception to trick the Cubans and Angolans into thinking that there was a much 
larger SADF force in position than actually was the case.  
 Cuba and FAPLA suffered nearly 5,000 dead during the period September 1987 until 
April 1988 in addition they lost hundreds of vehicles and nearly 100 tanks. The SADF suffered 
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31 killed in action and 6 more due to malaria in addition to a few vehicles lost143. Immediately 
after the final attacks Cuba declared victory over South Africa and to emphasize this photos were 
released showing a captured SADF tank. The US and South Africa dismissed these claims as 
propaganda, Cuba and Angola had definitely not prevailed. The reality could be seen as more of 
a stalemate. While the SADF had saved UNITA and neutralized the FAPLA attacks on Mavinga 
and Jamba, they had failed to force FAPLA back across the Cuito River. Given the limited 
resources Pretoria allowed the SADF, and also because of the fact that the SADF was denied to 
attack from the west, the final result is not at all surprising. It is impossible to win a war with 
limited means, especially when aims and objectives are not clearly defined, as definitely was the 
case with Pretoria’s planning144.  
 The battle of Cuito Cuanavale marked the end of large scale battles during the war 
though it would be another year before a cease fire would go into effect. On December 22nd 1988 
a treaty was signed between Cuba, Angola and South Africa in New York marking the official 
end of the war.  
 
  "If defeat for South Africa meant the loss of 31 men, three tanks, five armoured 
vehicles and three aircraft, then we'd lost. If victory for Fapla and the Cubans meant the loss of 
4,600 men, 94 tanks, 100 armoured vehicles, 9 aircraft and other Soviet equipment valued at 
more than a billion Rands, then they'd won.145" Said by Colonel Dean Ferreira, commander of 
SADF forces during battle of Cuito Cuanavale.  
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of the unconventional units 
Introduction  
 
 The 23 year long war left its marks. Not only in the countries that were heavily 
involved in it, but more importantly on the units that participated in the fighting and ultimately 
on the men that served on the frontlines.  
 In the introduction, it was stated that the aim of this paper was to show how battlefield 
successes in the end did not result in political success for South Africa.  Firstly the units were 
introduced and several operations in which these units played pivotal roles were highlighted. The 
question is now raised on why these successes did not result in a major South African political 
success at the conclusion of the war. Before this question will be answered, firstly the exploits of 
the units will be looked at in brief. A few comments need to be made about how to analyze such 
units.  
  The most common method is to look at the results achieved in wars, operations, 
missions and such in which the units in question were involved. It must be remembered that 
results on the battlefield alone often do not tell the whole story as politics and propaganda play a 
considerable part in it.  These last two factors make any kind of analysis challenging, especially 
in the case of the units described in this paper given the fact that they were employed by South 
Africa’s Apartheid government. This last remark is often used to place the accomplishments of 
these units in a negative light in the international media.  
 The unit most heavily criticized of the ones described in this paper was without any 
doubt Koevoet. They received so much bad publicity, reports of cruelty towards the local 
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population, dragging bodies through the streets, that the unit’s demobilization was required as 
part of the treaty on the independence of Namibia146. A few SADF generals were also not very 
pleased with Koevoet yet they admitted that the unit was extremely effective, though used cruel 
methods. It must be remembered however that this was a time of war; atrocities were committed 
by both sides, as is always the case while fighting wars.  
 The following section would look at each unit individually as it makes the task of 
analysis easier.  
Recces 
 The South African Special Forces took places in many operations during the Border 
War, many of which remain classified till this day. The Recces were utilized in a variety of roles, 
the most important being reconnaissance and commando raids behind enemy lines. The Recces 
were the elite of the SADF and they were very small in terms of personnel yet their impact was 
substantial. The number of active operators during the war was classified but it was rumored to 
be not more than 250 at the height of the war. Typical deployments consisted of a team of five 
Recces for a single operation. The unit’s first big operation, the raid on Dar es Salaam by four 
men, shows how a small unit can be achieving effective results.  
 Small-scale commando operations were important. Yet the most crucial role for the 
Recces during the war was to gather accurate intelligence, often behind enemy lines which the 
intelligence agencies would use to plan operations. During war, good intelligence and using it 
properly can make the difference between winning or losing a battle.  
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 The Recces were held in high esteem both friend and foe and the unit played an 
important role throughout the war.  
32 Bn 
 The 32 Bn, together with the Recces mentioned above, was the most distinguished 
SADF unit during the Border War. The unit was nicknamed the Buffalo battalion by the South 
Africans or the Os Terríveis (Portuguese for the Terrible Ones) by the enemy. The 32 Bn was 
unique in several ways. Firstly most of its members were Angolans and the unit used Portuguese 
as its main language, as opposed to Afrikaans and English. Secondly and very importantly, the 
32 Bn main based was located right at the border between Angola and SWA in the Caprivi Strip 
next to the Kuvango River.  
 The main task of the 32 Bn was to serve as a buffer between Angola and SWA. 
Because of this and the unit’s location, they were involved in more fighting than any other South 
African unit with the exception of perhaps the Recces and Koevoet. 32 Bn was engaged in 
combat nearly continuously for almost 13 years in 1989 before the unit was recalled to South 
Africa. During this period the unit suffered roughly 150 dead and killed or captured more than 
3,000 enemy troops, statistics that are similar to those achieved by Koevoet. The unit was never 
withdrawn from the frontline and it was served by professional troops, not by conscripts unlike 
regular SADF units. This allowed the unit to achieve a unique esprit de corps, only few officers 
would occasionally be replaced, however the vast majority of the troops stayed with the battalion 
for many years.  
 32 Bn took part in nearly every battle in Angola and the unit was highly feared by the 
enemy. The 32 Bn bore the brunt of the fighting which explains the unit’s heavy losses but they 
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played a pivotal role as the buffer between SWAPO and SWA. The unit was disbanded by 
Pretoria in 1993 as demanded by the ANC.  
44 Parachute Brigade 
 This unit is mostly remembered by its participation in the Cassinga Raid as operation 
Reindeer has become known in popular culture. This controversial airborne attack in 1978 
demonstrated precisely how effective a paratrooper assault against a well-defended target can be. 
Paratrooper units give much greater flexibility and mobility to an army and are very effective 
force multipliers. 44 Parachute Brigade participated in many operations during the Border War 
and a troop of paratroopers was always on standby as a reaction force in the operational area. 
Combined with SAAF support the paratroopers were very effective against enemy troops but 
their participation in Operation Reindeer was regarded as their finest hour. Reindeer was the 
SADF’s single most successful operation of the entire war, though to this day SWAPO maintains 
the statement that the SADF attacked a refugee camp. Nonetheless this attack is regarded as a 
benchmark for successful airborne assaults.  
 The establishment of a paratrooper force gave the SADF extra options during the war 
and the unit’s importance was substantial on the battlefield. Nonetheless, compared to the 32 Bn 
and the Recces, they had less influence on the war as a whole due to the fact that they were not 
involved in the fighting fulltime, unlike the other two units.  
Koevoet 
 As has been already mentioned, Koevoet remains highly controversial. The unit was 
extremely effective yet linked to many controversial acts and atrocities. In the unit’s introduction 
it was said that in the late 1970’s South Africa was starting to lose the war against SWAPO and a 
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different approach was required. Koevoet was a unique unit and was created to meet the 
requirements of fighting in SWA. It combined the excellent tracker skills of the local population 
with specially designed vehicles and tactics designed by South Africans. Together these made an 
extremely effective and highly feared unit. During the 10 years of fighting, Koevoet suffered 
many casualties, roughly 160 dead and more than 900 wounded but they were responsible for 
more than 3,200 killed or captured SWAPO. Koevoet suffered more casualties than any South 
African unit in the war, even more than 32 Bn, since the end of WWII147.  
 From the unit’s establishment in 1978 to its disbandment in 1989, SWAPO were 
unable to establish bases and gradually take over SWA, as was their plan. This result can of 
course never be attributed solely to Koevoet but they did play a very large role in it. It is 
estimated that Koevoet were responsible for roughly 80% of SWAPO casualties in SWA, despite 
consisting of only a small part of the total South African contingent in SWA148.   
Weapons  
 A few comments are in order regarding the weapons used by both sides during the war. 
South Africa was under heavy international sanctions due to her Apartheid policies and most 
countries had put in place arms embargoes making it virtually impossible for South Africa to 
import sophisticated weapons. South Africa developed its own arms industry which was able to 
produce a variety of weapons specifically designed for the Border War. These weapons were 
highly effective yet not as advanced as the weapons produced by the United States or the USSR. 
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A few exceptions included the Casspir armored personnel vehicle and the G-5/G-6 artillery, both 
of which were regarded as arguably the best in the world.  
 SWAPO/Cuba, Angola was all provided with Soviet style weapons provided mostly 
for free by the USSR. The USSR shipped weapons, materials, food and equipment valued 
between 5.5 and 10 billion US dollars during the 1970’s and 1980’s149. This included advanced 
Soviet weapons available at the time, including Mig-23 fighter planes, T-62 tanks and some of 
the most advanced anti-aircraft defenses, the SAM-8 system.  In terms of quantity of weapons 
and equipment, South Africa’s adversaries had a massive advantage. In terms of quality it was 
even more in general but the MiG-23 planes and the Mi-24/25 attack helicopters were better than 
anything that the SAAF possessed due to the embargo.  
 The lack of sufficient quantities and quality of conventional weapon systems could be 
seen as another reason why Pretoria preferred to use unconventional units to do to the majority of 
the fighting. By this it could be seen that Pretoria almost had to do this by necessity, rather than 
by design as they simply had no other choice.  
Politics 
 In the Border War, as in every war, politics played a very large role. Pretoria had 
sought to keep the war limited and as far away from the public as possible. However it is 
impossible to win such a complicated war involving many foreign powers including both 
superpowers, with limited means. Pretoria did not have a clear vision of what they hoped to 
accomplish.  Even during operations themselves, objectives were often modified which made life 
very difficult for the military and it was also difficult to accomplish effective results. Essentially 
                                                          
149 Lyulko, L, 2012 
80 
 
the SADF had its hands tied throughout the entire war; nonetheless despite being outnumbered 
during most of the battles, the SADF almost always prevailed and won the war militarily. 
Politically however, the Border War was a massive failure for South Africa that received 
tremendous negative attention from the international community, which greatly influenced 
political decisions. A perfect example was the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. Instead of attacking 
from the west, which would have been far easier, Pretoria demanded the SADF to advance from 
the east, which in the end provided impossible with the very small force that the SADF was 
authorized to use.  
 Another very important aspect for Pretoria was their attempt to minimize their own 
casualties. The main method for this was simply to not employ large regular formations in 
Angola. The bulk of SA regular forces were stationed in SWA on garrison duty. It has been 
estimated that 95% of SA troops during the Border War never saw any combat. The brunt of the 
fighting and the casualties were suffered by the unconventional units mentioned in this paper. 
The 32 Bn and Koevoet were mostly staffed by non-South African citizens. While there is no 
direct link to suggest that this was done on purpose, it does leave one thinking. One of the tasks 
that befell General Geldenhuys, when he was General Officer Commanding SWA, was to ensure 
more than 70% of troops stationed in that sector were locals.  
There was another reason why South Africa preferred to use small specialized units 
during the Border War. It offered deniability. With South Africa being under intense 
international scrutiny, it was much easier to use unconventional units as it was far easier to deny 
their use in the field. Operations carried out by the 32 Bn, Koevoet, 44 Brigade and the Recces 
were hardly known in South Africa, which was exactly what the SA leadership wanted. Firstly to 
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give the impression that everything was under control and secondly to keep the international 
community at bay.  
To give an example, often when the 32 Bn took part in operations in Angola the troops 
dressed in SWAPO uniforms and carried Soviet bloc weapons and equipment. In addition the 
unit used Portuguese as their main language as communication, which was due to the fact that 
most 32 Bn troops were Angolans.   
Due to these two reasons the civilian leadership was often in disagreement with the South 
African Defense Force (SADF) on how to fight the war. Often the SADF was told that the war 
would have to be fought in limited way using limited forces and because of this the 
unconventional units were used.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 It lies outside the scope of this paper to describe the years of negotiations that preceded 
the final peace agreement that was signed in New York in 1988 that marked the end of the 
Border War which lasted 23 years, the ceasefire went in effect in the spring of 1989.  
  The numerically superior joint Cuban and Angolan forces were never able to 
destroy UNITA completely, this was entirely due to South African support. On the battlefield 
South African losses were drastically lower than the losses of SWAPO, Angolan or the Cuban 
military. The four units singled out for this paper were chosen as they, due to various factors, 
were able to hit their adversaries time and time again. Having said that, not even these four elite 
unconventional units were able to win the war for South Africa. The Border War was never a 
war that was going to be resolved solely by military means, given the high level of foreign 
involvement and the political landscape at the time. 
  It is often said that military accomplishments can only be measured by the political 
results as after, military means are utilized to accomplish political objectives. In the case of 
South Africa, the stated political objective was not clearly defined and without a clearly defined 
political objective good military results mean very little as they do not lead to the required end 
state. A perfect example of this was Operation Reindeer. Seen from a military perspective, this 
was the finest South African operation of the entire war, yet politically it was an unmitigated 
disaster.   
 Despite not having a clear political objective, the SADF were able to save UNITA 
from being destroyed by a massive commitment from the USSR, East Germany and Cuba who 
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were all aiding the MPLA. South African military success was sufficient to convince the 
opposing side that negotiating with South Africa was the only way to resolve the conflict. The 
same argument can be made for South Africa. However it must be remembered that South Africa 
never had the intention to wage a full-blown war neither in SWA nor in Angola.  
Turning this question around does raise an interesting point. Based on the military results 
alone South Africa seemed to be the moral victor, the eventual ceasefire and peace agreement 
seems to suggest otherwise. South Africa lost South West Africa and in September 1989 F.W de 
Klerk became the President of South Africa which essentially saw the end of Apartheid. Many 
opponents of Apartheid speak of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale as the turning point in the end of 
Apartheid. This claim is somewhat presumptuous as the end of Apartheid was the result of many 
factors, one of which was the Border War.    
 The year 1989 saw several big political changes. Firstly the Soviet Union was losing 
its grip on Eastern Europe, which culminated in Berlin when the border between East and West 
Berlin was opened on November 7th 1989. The so called fall of the Berlin wall is regarded by 
many as the end of the Cold War. As was stated earlier the new Soviet leader Gorbachev sought 
to end Soviet influence in Angola and elsewhere and wanted to conclude the war. Also within 
South Africa things were rapidly changing. Starting in the mid 1980’s political unrest and 
resistance against Apartheid increased massively. The situation was rapidly spiraling out of 
control and when F. W de Klerk became SA’s President he quickly stated that the system of 
Apartheid would come to an end. The transition from Apartheid South Africa to democratic 
South Africa took many years of negotiating between the ANC and the National Party and was 
only finished in 1994 when Nelson Mandela was elected into office as South Africa’s first black 
President.   
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In the 1980’s the international economic embargo was starting to leave its mark on the 
South African economy which resulted in a rapidly increasing inflation rate, combined with 
increasing unemployed especially amongst Blacks combined with the stalemate in the war made 
sure that South Africa were finally willing to negotiate a conclusion to the conflict. Neither side 
wanted to appear weak during the negotiations but secretly all parties wanted to resolve the 
conflict quickly as the war was a huge drain on the economies of both sides.  
In conclusion, while it is clear how effective these specialized units were to South Africa’ 
s effort, their overall effect on the success on the war is rather small. As could be seen in the 
analysis and the conclusion, the changing political landscape, the fall of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the collapse of Apartheid were much more important to the ending of the war.  
 
The new era which is dawning… will lift us out of the silent grief of our past and into a future in 
which there will be opportunity and space for joy and beauty - for real and lasting peace150. – 
F.W de Klerk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
150 Farnsworth, J. S. 
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Chapter 6 
Appendix 
 Maps 
 
Map 1: Overview of region where the war took place151 
 
Map 2: Map showing Angola/SWA border area, this where nearly all fighting took place152 
                                                          
151 http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_Africa_Border_War_Map.png 
152 Geldenhuys, Jannie, A General’s Story, 2009, pxvii 
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Map 3: Map showing extent of SADF advance into Angola during Operation Savannah153 
                                                          
153 George, Edward, The Cuban intervention in Angola, 1965 – 1991, 2005, p95 
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Map 4: FAPLA’s 1987 offensive against UNITA154 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
154 Nortje, Piet, 32 Battalion, 2003, p235 
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South African Military Command Structure 
 
 
Diagram 1: Outline of the South African Military Command structure155 
 
The Recces reported directly to the Chief of the SADF. 
The 32 Bn and the 44 Parachute Brigade fell under the SA Army. 
Koevoet, being a police unit, did not fall under the jurisdiction of the SADF. Koevoet was 
commanded directly from the SAP headquarters in Pretoria.  
 
 
                                                          
155 Strachan, B. R. (2007) 
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Glossary  
20 Brigade: Name given to SADF contingent at the start of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, 
consisting of several 32 Bn companies, some Recce units, artillery and support elements 
AAA: Anti-aircraft artillery, heavy machine guns or cannons designed to neutralize aircraft, can 
consist of either mobile or fixed units 
Alouette: Light transport chopper of French design, many were modified by the SAAF to carry 
machineguns and rocket pods to be used as gunships 
ANC: African National Congress 
Calueque: Location of a dam as part of the SA and Portugal hydroelectric project 
Biafra: Eastern part of Nigeria that declared itself independent in 1967, was reincorporated into 
Nigeria in 1970 
Caprivi region: Narrow strip of land on the far east of SWA (Namibia) bordering Angola, 
Botswana and Zambia 
Casspir: South African designed heavily armored mine resistant personnel carriers, used 
extensively due the Border War 
Castro: Fidel Castro was Cuba’s leader during the Border War, he sanctioned the Cuban 
deployment to Angola 
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency, foremost foreign intelligence agency, heavily involved during 
the Border War, ferrying in supplies for UNITA together with South Africa 
FNLA: National Liberation Front of Angola 
Force multiplier: A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, 
significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of 
successful mission accomplishment 
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SAM – 7: Soviet designed man portable low altitude anti-aircraft missile system 
FAPLA: People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, initially military component of 
the MPLA, later it became Angola’s official armed forces 
G-5: South African designed 155 mm artillery, very long long range and precise, considered as 
some of the finest artillery in the world 
Hearts and minds: Often heard during counter insurgency campaigns, the basic premise is that 
popular support of the local population is crucial during such campaigns. The side who obtains 
the most popular support usually ends up as winner during such campaigns 
Luanda: Capital of Angola, was the location of main Portuguese garrison when it was still a 
colony 
Mi-24: Soviet designed heavy attack helicopter, very heavily armored, was deployed to Angola 
in the 1980’s 
Mig-23: Advanced Soviet designed fighter bomber, more advanced than the SAAF Mirage F1’s 
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
P.W. Botha: South African Minister of Defense from 1966 – 1978 
PLAN: People’s Liberation Army of Namibia, military arm of SWAPO 
Pretoria: Seat of South African government, used to symbolize SA leadership 
Commandant: South African rank, equivalent to Lieutenant - Colonel  
Puma: Heavy transport helicopter of French design used by the SAAF, it had capacity for 16 
passengers 
Reaction force/standby force: Units that are on alert and able to respond extremely quickly 
when a situation or emergency arises 
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Rhodesia: Former name of Zimbabwe, neighbor of South Africa 
SAAF: South African Air Force 
SADF: South African Defence Force, military of South Africa 
Sam Nujoma: leader of SWAPO, later first president of Namibia 
SAM: Surface to air missiles, radar guided missiles launched from either mobile or fixed units 
designed to shoot down aircraft 
61 Mechanised Battalion: Conventional SADF battalion, well equipped with armored vehicles 
and artillery, it took part in many operations during the Border War 
SAP: South African Police 
SAS: Special Air Service, originally British Special Forces, also the name to the SF of several ex 
British colonies such as Rhodesian SAS, Austrialian SAS etc 
Stopper groups: Units deployed to cut off the escape routes of enemy forces, often employed by 
the SADF during the Border War 
SWAPO: South West Africa People’s Organisation 
Owamboland: Northernmost part of SWA (Namibia), home to the Owambo people 
T-55: Soviet designed tank that entered service in the 1950’s, was heavily used during the 
Border War, but was significantly outclassed by SADF tanks and tactics 
T-62: Soviet designed tank that entered service in the 1960’s, more effective than the T-55 
UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 435: Adopted in September 1978, it called for a 
ceasefire and UN supervised elections in SWA, in order for it become independent. 
 
 
92 
 
Bibliography 
 
(2011). Retrieved from Koevoet 1979 - 1989 "Komesho": http://koevoet.webs.com/ 
Aksit, C. (2012). NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (ENGLISH AND 
FRENCH). Brussels: NATO. 
African National Congress (ANC). 2008. Statement of the National Executive Committee of the 
African national Congress on the occasion of the 96th anniversary of the ANC: 8 January 2008. 
www.anc.org 
Farnsworth, J. S. (n.d.). The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics. Retrieved from Santa Clara 
University: http://www.scu.edu/ethics/architects-of-peace/de%20Klerk/essay.html 
 
Geldenhuys, J. (2009). A General's Story. Jepperstown: Jonathan Ball Publishers. 
George, E. (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965 - 1991. Abingdon: Frank Cass. 
Goldstein, L. (2004). Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
Hamann, H. (2007). Days of the Generals. Cape Town: Struik Publishers. 
Hooper, J. (2012). Koevoet! Rugby: GG Books. 
ICJ. (1950). International status of South-West Africa. The Hague: ICJ. 
Lord, D. (1992). Operation Askari. Stellenbosch: Scientia Miltaria. 
Lord, D. (2008). From Fledging to Eagle. Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South. 
Lyulko, L. (2012, March 19). Glorious Soviet past of glorious African nation. Retrieved from 
Pravda.ru: http://english.pravda.ru/world/africa/19-03-2012/120826-angola-0/ 
Martin, M. (1984). The first dance of freedom - Black Africa in the postwar era. London: 
Hamish Hamilton. 
93 
 
McGill, A. (2000). South African Airborne Operations. Stellenbosch: Scientia Militaria. 
Nortje, P. (2004). 32 Battalion. Cape Town: Zebra Press. 
Phillips, C. L. (1956). Cockshell Heroes. London: Heinemann. 
SADF. (1989). Paratus, 14. 
Sharp, W. L. (2001). Joint Publication 3-05.1. Washington D.C: Department of Defense. 
Shillington, K. (2005). Encyclopedia to African History. New York: Routledge. 
Spriggs, A. (n.d.). Africa: Coastal Namibia and Angola. Retrieved from World Wildlife Fund: 
http://worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/at1310 
Steenkamp, W. (1989). South Africa's Border War 1966 - 1989. Benoni: Ashanti Publishing. 
Stiff, P. (1999). The Silent War. Galapego: Johannesburg. 
Stiff, P. (2005). The Covert War. Alberton : Galago. 
Strachan, B. R. (2007). Suid Afrikaanse Weermag - South African Defence Force . Retrieved 
from SADF.info: http://www.sadf.info/SADF.html 
Uys, I. (1992). Cross of Honour. Gemiston: Uys Publishing. 
Warwick, R. (2012). Operation Svannah: A measure of SADF Decline, Resourcefullness and 
Modernisation. Stellenbosch: Scientia Militaria. 
Weaver, A. (1996, November 27). Truth and Reconciliation Commission Day 2: 27 November 
1996. (A. NTSEBEZA, Interviewer) 
 
 
 
 
 
